UNIVERSITY of PENNSYLVANIA
LAW REVIEW
Founded 1852
Formerly
AMERICAN LAW REGISTER
© 2022 University of Pennsylvania Law Review

VOL. 170

JANUARY 2022

NO. 2

ARTICLE

TAX LAW AS FOREIGN POLICY

ASHLEY DEEKS† & ANDREW HAYASHI††
The use of economic statecraft is at a high-water mark. The United States uses
sanctions, tariﬀs, and import and export controls more than ever before. These tools

† Professor of Law (on leave), University of Virginia School of Law.
†† Class of 1948 Professor of Scholarly Research in Law, University of Virginia School of Law.
Professor Hayashi is also a McDonald Distinguished Fellow at the Center for the Study of Law and
Religion at Emory University.
We thank Andrew Keller, Susie Morse, Ashley Roberts, Howard Wachtel, and participants at
the AMT Summer Tax Workshop for helpful comments. We are indebted to Ruth Mason and Paul
Stephan for their generous feedback. They are responsible for signiﬁcant improvements to this
Article but not for any errors or omissions. We also thank Natalie Anderson, Tian Yi Bao, Kealan
Hannes, James Harper, Micheal Klepper, Kent Olson, Anna Cecile Pepper, and Trevor Sikes for
excellent research assistance. Professor Deeks co-wrote this article while serving as a Professor at

(275)

276

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 170: 275

have problems, though. They impose financial costs on domestic interests. They can
induce retaliation by target states. And overuse of these tools could drive the United
States from its central position in the global financial and economic system,
undermining the eﬀectiveness of U.S. economic statecraft in the long run. But there
is an underappreciated tool that could perform valuable foreign policy work: tax law.
We argue that tax law holds promise to advance U.S. foreign policy interests and that
it is especially important to deploy tax tools now. Tax law has distinctive features that
make it both a partial substitute and a partial complement to other tools of economic
coercion, which means that it can extend the influence of U.S. economic power while
reducing the risk of overusing other economic tools.
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INTRODUCTION
Less than two weeks after his inauguration, citing national security
interests, President Biden reinstated a ten percent tariﬀ on aluminum
imports from the United Arab Emirates that President Trump initially
imposed in 2018.1 Whatever their other diﬀerences, Democratic and
Republican administrations have had the same growing appetite for using
economic tools to pursue foreign policy and national security goals. From
raising tariﬀs to freezing assets to imposing trade restrictions, the federal
government has left few stones unturned in trying to gain ﬁnancial leverage
over foreign states, companies, and individuals.2 And yet, because of overuse
and increased competition from alternative currencies and payment systems,
we may be approaching the limits of these tools’ eﬀectiveness.3 According to
1 See Proclamation No. 10144, 86 Fed. Reg. 8625 (Feb. 1, 2021); Proclamation No. 9704, 83 Fed.
Reg. 11619 (Mar. 8, 2018).
2 Richard N. Haass, Economic Sanctions: Too Much of a Bad Thing, BROOKINGS (June 1, 1998),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/economic-sanctions-too-much-of-a-bad-thing [https://perma.cc/
C5UV-54QK] (“[E]conomic sanctions are fast becoming the policy tool of choice for the United
States in the post-cold war world.”).
3 See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, THE TREASURY 2021 SANCTIONS REVIEW (2021); see also
Daniel Flatley, U.S. Treasury Says Crypto, Rival Currencies Risk Eroding Sanctions, BLOOMBERG (Oct.
18, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-10-18/treasury-sees-digital-local-currenciesundermining-sanctions [https://perma.cc/N26R-NTH9].
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former Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew, “[t]he outlook for U.S. economic
statecraft, if it continues on its present trajectory, is bleak.”4 But perhaps we
can change this trajectory. There is an economic tool for advancing foreign
policy interests that Congress and the Executive have barely touched in
recent years: the federal income tax. The time has come to reconsider what
tax law can oﬀer.
Any person within the long reach of U.S. income tax jurisdiction can be
inﬂuenced to make choices that advance U.S. foreign policy.5 The leverage of
the income tax comes from the United States’ appeal as a destination for
foreign capital, its enormous consumer base, and the size and economic power
of U.S. multinational corporations.6 Foreigners are eager to invest their
wealth in U.S. assets, sell to U.S. consumers, and organize their businesses in
the United States. But despite its potential as a source of foreign policy
leverage, one ﬁnds only the residue of outdated foreign policy objectives in
today’s income tax law.
This is not because Congress is shy about using the income tax for
purposes other than revenue collection. Congress has enthusiastically used
the income tax to pursue social and economic policies, such as poverty
reduction,7 the environment,8 and health care.9 It is also not because there is
no precedent for using the income tax to implement foreign policy. Tax law
was used periodically in the twentieth century to favor certain foreign states,10
and the United States has more than sixty bilateral income tax treaties that

4 Jacob J. Lew & Richard Nephew, The Use and Misuse of Economic Statecraft, FOREIGN AFFS.,
Nov./Dec. 2018, at 139, 147.
5 U.S. citizens and residents are taxed on their worldwide income. Taxpayers Living Abroad,
INTERNAL REV. SERV. (June 3, 2021), https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/
taxpayers-living-abroad [https://perma.cc/4NSJ-CMC7]. Foreign persons are subject to U.S. tax on
income that is eﬀectively connected with a trade or business in the United States and U.S. source
income that is not connected to a U.S. trade or business. I.R.C. §§ 872(a), 881, 882. Unless otherwise
indicated, all section references in this Article are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
6 Scholars have identiﬁed six sources of U.S. economic leverage. PETER E. HARRELL &
ELIZABETH ROSENBERG, ECONOMIC DOMINANCE, FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY, AND THE
FUTURE OF U.S. ECONOMIC COERCION 8 (2019) (“The United States’ coercive economic leverage
rests on . . . the strength of the U.S. dollar, the soundness of U.S. banks, the massive size of the
U.S. market, the depth of U.S. companies in global supply chains, the massive breadth of foreign
investment by U.S. ﬁrms, and transparency requirements in the U.S. ﬁnancial system.”).
7 Hilary W. Hoynes & Ankur J. Patel, Eﬀective Policy for Reducing Poverty and Inequality? The
Earned Income Tax Credit and the Distribution of Income, 53 J. HUM. RES. 859, 860 (2018) (stating that
the earned income tax credit is “the largest antipoverty program for children in the United States”).
8 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 38(b)(8), 45 (allowing a business tax credit for electricity produced from
renewable sources).
9 I.R.C. § 5000A (establishing a tax on those who do not maintain minimum health
insurance coverage).
10 See discussion infra Section II.B.
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advance cooperative relationships with foreign states.11 But today’s Internal
Revenue Code (the Code) incorporates foreign policy goals in only a few
limited ways. And Congress made sweeping changes to the Code in 201712
that undermined the eﬀectiveness of these foreign policy provisions
inadvertently and without any discussion in the legislative record.
Whatever the historical reasons for sidelining the income tax as a tool
of foreign policy, recent technological innovation in the global financial
system and the evolution of the United States’ role in the international
political and economic order should compel policymakers to reconsider tax
as a tool of economic statecraft. We want to provoke that reconsideration.
We show that compared with sanctions, tariffs, and other coercive economic
instruments, tax law is an underappreciated foreign policy tool, particularly
at the present moment.
We begin by describing the most common economic tools in use today:
ﬁnancial sanctions, import tariﬀs, and export controls. Each of these tools of
economic coercion has been criticized. For example, scholars have argued that
the United States often is unclear about the goals of its sanctions and that it
rarely repeals sanctions, even if the targets adjust their behavior.13 Some
criticize trade tariﬀs for being ineﬀective and for burdening U.S. consumers
more than foreign targets,14 while others argue that these tariﬀs violate U.S.
international legal obligations.15 Scholars, companies, and U.S. allies alike
criticize the export control system for being “too restrictive, insuﬃciently
restrictive, cumbersome, obsolete, ineﬃcient, or any combinations of these
descriptions.”16 In short, while the United States needs economic foreign
policy tools, the tools it has traditionally deployed have gaps in coverage and
deﬁciencies in implementation.
Imperfect though they may be, the government uses these tools more than
ever before. As the primary alternative to military force, the appeal of
11 Doing Business in the United States: US Tax Treaties, PWC, https://www.pwc.com/us/en/services/
tax/us-inbound-tax/doing-business-in-the-united-states/us-tax-treaties.html
[https://perma.cc/62T7MBYF] (“The United States has in place bilateral income tax treaties with more than 60 countries.”).
12 See TAX FOUND. STAFF, PRELIMINARY DETAILS AND ANALYSIS OF THE TAX CUTS AND
JOBS ACT (2017) (summarizing major changes brought about by the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act).
See discussion infra subsection II.C.2.c for details on the impact these 2017 changes had on foreign
policy provisions within the Code.
13 See, e.g., SaraBeth Egle, The Learning Curve of Sanctions—Have Three Decades of Sanctions
Reform Taught Us Anything?, CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J., Summer 2011, at 34.
14 See, e.g., Harry Wolﬀ, Unilateral Economic Sanctions: Necessary Foreign Policy Tool or Ineﬀective
Hindrance on American Businesses?, 6 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 329, 362-64 (2006).
15 See, e.g., Uchechukwu Nwoke, Imposition of Trade Tariﬀs by the USA on China: Implications for
the WTO and International Trade Law, 19 J. INT’L TRADE L. & POL’Y 69, 75 (2020) (arguing that
U.S. tariﬀs against China violate obligations under the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade).
16 IAN F. FERGUSSON & PAUL K. KERR, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41916, THE U.S. EXPORT
CONTROL SYSTEM AND THE EXPORT CONTROL REFORM INITIATIVE 1 (2020).
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economic coercion is obvious. But the United States’ increased reliance on
economic leverage raises a concern of its own: that overuse may cause foreign
actors to divest from the U.S. currency, ﬁnancial system, and import market.
We do not argue that tax law should be the sole instrument of economic
statecraft. But adding tax law to the economic toolkit makes it possible to
reduce ﬁnancial sanctions, tariﬀs, and export controls, thus reducing the risk
of divestment from the U.S. ﬁnancial sector and dollar as a reserve currency
and thereby preserving the vitality of these other tools. More generally, each
economic tool involves tradeoﬀs between foreign policy objectives and other
goals, such as economic growth. Introducing tax law as another tool takes the
pressure oﬀ the other tools and facilitates more advantageous tradeoﬀs.
In addition to relieving pressure on overused tools, tax law ﬁlls gaps in
the existing regime. Trade sanctions aﬀect only imports and exports of
speciﬁed goods and services. Financial sanctions are often limited to speciﬁc
industries and can only reach foreign targets who hold U.S.-situs assets or
who use the U.S. banking system. The Committee on Foreign Investment in
the United States (discussed below) covers inﬂows of capital into strategically
important industries.17 And the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act requires
compliance with U.S. anti-bribery laws to access U.S. capital markets.18 This
patchwork of laws is extensive but incomplete. Tax law reaches all income
earned by U.S. persons and all income arising in the United States, which
increases the coverage of economic statecraft both by enlarging the set of
jurisdictional contacts with foreign persons and enlarging the set of industries
and economic activities that can be reached. Finally, tax law also allows for a
ﬁner calibration of economic deterrence because tax incentives can be
adjusted in degrees, allowing an appropriate level of economic activity to
continue rather than foreclosing that activity entirely by prohibition, as
embargoes and some sanctions regimes do.
Having made the case for tax law as a tool of foreign policy, we consider
crucial questions about institutional competence and administration.
Because Congress makes tax laws, it is important to ensure that foreign
policy enacted through tax law incorporates the expertise of the Executive
and that tax laws can respond to rapidly changing conditions. We examine
the existing foreign policy–related tax rules and show that Congress has
already demonstrated an ability to provide the Executive with the discretion
and agility it requires. Two of the most significant objections to our proposal

17 See generally The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), U.S. DEP’T
TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/the-committee-on-foreigninvestment-in-the-united-states-cfius [https://perma.cc/W5B3-PTKU].
18 See generally Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Feb. 3, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/foreign-corrupt-practices-act [https://perma.cc/NC6D-R4VA].
OF
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are the additional rent seeking that it could facilitate and whether it would
fall afoul of international legal obligations through the World Trade
Organization. These concerns are important but not insurmountable, and we
argue that the risks are worth the rewards.
In Part I, we survey economic statecraft, focusing on how coercive
economic tools disrupt the normal functioning of foreign states and other
foreign actors. Part II describes the history and current state of U.S. federal
income tax law as a foreign policy tool. In Part III, we argue that the time is
right to use tax law more aggressively to advance U.S. foreign policy goals,
and we identify three areas that hold the greatest promise for doing so. In
Part IV, we respond to objections to our argument and consider some
important choices that must be made to ensure the most eﬀective
implementation of our proposals.
I. TOOLS OF ECONOMIC STATECRAFT
For much of its history, the United States has used economic levers of
power to advance its foreign policy goals.19 Part of what constitutes “economic
statecraft” reﬂects U.S. eﬀorts to encourage economic development at home
and abroad.20 These positive tools include bilateral investment treaties;
multilateral trade arrangements and free trade zones; the use of the Export–
Import Bank to encourage U.S. companies to export goods and services
overseas; the creation of the Development Finance Corporation to promote
investments by U.S. businesses in less developed countries; the provision of
loan guarantees; U.S. support for international institutions such as the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund; and the provision of foreign aid.
These kinds of economic carrots are not the focus of this Article.
We focus instead on the economic sticks that the United States deploys
to achieve foreign policy and national security aims. These tools are intended
to coerce foreign actors to change their behavior or to deprive those actors of
the ability to act. At a general level, these sticks impose restrictions or
burdens upon transactions by or with a target country, its nationals, or
designated groups, with the intended eﬀect of creating dysfunction in the
target’s commercial and ﬁnancial transactions, in the service of speciﬁed U.S.
foreign policy goals.

19 See generally Lance Davis & Stanley Engerman, History Lessons: Sanctions: Neither War nor
Peace, 17 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 187, 192 (2003) (detailing the use of embargoes, tariﬀs, and
sanctions by the United States throughout the twentieth century).
20 See generally DAVID BALDWIN, ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 29 (2020) (deﬁning economic
statecraft as “governmental inﬂuence attempts relying primarily on resources that have a reasonable
semblance of a market price in terms of money”).
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This Part explores three such tools: embargoes and economic sanctions,
tariﬀs, and export controls. We consider the history of each tool, which helps
explain why the tools are more familiar to U.S. national security and foreign
policy oﬃcials than taxation. We assess which targets these tools are designed
to inﬂuence and which actors the U.S. government relies on to implement
them. We examine the tools’ underlying legal bases and the bureaucratic
pathways by which they are implemented and enforced.
In addition, we consider criticisms of these tools and draw out three
points. First, by their nature, these tools require the U.S. government to make
tradeoﬀs between foreign policy goals and domestic economic interests.
Second, these tools often operate as blunt instruments that, in the view of
some scholars, the government uses unwisely and too frequently. Third, the
government relies heavily on companies—especially U.S. companies—to
implement and bear many of the costs.21
A. Embargoes and Economic Sanctions
Since its founding, the United States has periodically banned or restricted
commercial transactions with foreign actors.22 In extreme cases, these
restrictions take the form of total embargoes that bar trade and ﬁnancial
relations between the United States and the target state.23 Today, economic
sanctions tend to be better targeted than embargoes, which paint with a broad
brush and therefore can impose harm on innocent participants in the target
economy as well as on U.S. interests. Although sanctions, like embargoes,
may target a state’s leadership, the United States also directs sanctions against
a range of other actors and may focus on speciﬁc sectors or activities.

21 Corporations act as public regulators across multiple contexts. See Rory Van Loo, The New
Gatekeepers: Private Firms as Public Enforcers, 106 VA. L. REV. 467, 499 (2020) (stating that the
administrative state uses the resources of large ﬁrms to enforce regulations). See generally Kate
Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Free Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV.
1598 (2018) (describing how online platforms serve as speech regulators).
22 Consider, for example, the U.S. embargoes on Cuba and Vietnam discussed below in the
text accompanying notes 31–46.
23 Often embargoes allow the Treasury or Commerce Departments to grant licenses for
specific exceptions to the embargo, such as transactions providing food or humanitarian supplies.
For information on OFAC’s licensing policy for activities related to Cuba, see Cuba Sanctions,
U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/sanctionsprograms-and-country-information/cuba-sanctions [https://perma.cc/X3JQ-STFJ].
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1. Embargoes
The United States imposes total embargoes on other states to signal its
condemnation of a foreign regime.24 Sometimes the United States identiﬁes
speciﬁc steps that the foreign state could take to persuade the United States
to lift the embargo. In exceptional cases, regime change is the only way to
obtain relief. Currently, the United States has near-complete embargoes on
Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Syria.25 But embargoes are costly. Because they
curtail commerce between the United States and the target state, embargoes
reduce market access, proﬁts, and suppliers for U.S. companies.
a. History
Embargoes have a long history. In 1807, as the British and French harassed
U.S. shipping, Congress (at President Jeﬀerson’s request)26 authorized the
President to restrict the passage of goods from U.S. ports to overseas
destinations,27 to protect U.S. sailors and goods and “starve the oﬀending
nations.”28 U.S. states resisted the embargo because of the harm it inﬂicted
on their economies, rendering the embargo ineﬀective.29 Congress then
enacted the First Enforcement Act, which gave the President and Treasury
Department oﬃcials broad powers to oversee ship loadings and authorize
vessels to set sail.30 This early example forecasts the impact of embargoes on
the U.S. economy, the role and discretion of the Executive in applying such
measures, and the responsibility of the Treasury Department to enforce the
measures—all things that still exist today.
Although complete embargoes often arise during war, others have
persisted during peacetime. For example, the United States imposed a trade
embargo on North Vietnam in 1964 during the Vietnam War,31 but the
24 See, e.g., James M. Lindsay, Trade Sanctions as Policy Instruments: A Re-Examination, 30 INT’L
STUDS. Q. 153, 155-56, 164-66 (1986) (discussing several examples).
25 See 15 C.F.R. § 746.1 (2021) (listing states).
26 Embargo of 1807, JEFFERSON MONTICELLO, https://www.monticello.org/site/research-andcollections/embargo-1807 [https://perma.cc/GY8U-T7MB].
27 Act of Dec. 22, 1807, ch. 5, 2 Stat. 451 (repealed 1809); Act of Jan. 9, 1808, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 453
(Second Embargo Act); Act of Mar. 12, 1808, ch. 33, 2 Stat. 473 (Third Embargo Act) (restricting
the passage of goods to the United Kingdom and France).
28 Letter from President Thomas Jeﬀerson to Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury (Apr. 8,
1808) in 12 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 27 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907).
29 Michael Bahar, The Presidential Intervention Principle: The Domestic Use of the Military and the
Power of the Several States, 5 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 537, 556-57 (2014) (describing how states refused
to enforce the embargo).
30 Act of Apr. 25, 1808, ch. 66, 2 Stat. 499 (assigning the President the authority to give
clearance for ships conducting foreign trade).
31 Thomas R. Stauch, The United States and Vietnam: Overcoming the Past and Investing in the
Future, 28 INT’L LAW. 995, 996 (1994).
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embargo remained in place until 1994 when President Clinton lifted it after
Vietnam made progress on recovering remains of U.S. prisoners of war.32
Perhaps the best-known embargo is the U.S. embargo on Cuba. The United
States imposed the embargo in the early 1960s because Cuba nationalized
several U.S.-owned oil reﬁneries without compensating the owners.33 The
goal of the embargo was to isolate Cuba’s government and bring democracy
to the Cuban people by forcing Fidel Castro out of power.34 President Obama
loosened some restrictions on Cuba and restored diplomatic relations, but
President Trump re-imposed the restrictions in 2019.35
b. Statutory Authorities and Implementation
Congress has played a signiﬁcant role in U.S. embargoes, exercising its
constitutional power to regulate foreign commerce.36 For example, Congress
has both imposed direct restrictions on commerce with Cuba and delegated
certain enforcement discretion to the Executive.37 President Eisenhower’s
original 1960 declaration was based on the authority provided to him in the
Export Control Act.38 Since then, Congress has changed the law applicable
to the Cuba embargo ﬁve times, passing the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
and the so-called “Hickenlooper amendments” of 1962 and 1963, the Cuban
Assets Control Regulations in 1963, the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992,39 the
Helms-Burton Act,40 and the Trade Sanctions Reform Act of 2000. Many of

32 Marian Nash (Leich), Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law,
88 AM. J. INT’L L. 515, 521 (1994).
33 C ONG. R SCH. SERV., IF10045, C UBA: U.S. POLICY O VERVIEW (2021); see also
AMNESTY INT’L, THE U.S. EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA: ITS IMPACT ON ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL RIGHTS 7 (2009).
34 William M. LeoGrande, A Policy Long Past Its Expiration Date: US Economic Sanctions Against
Cuba, 82 SOC. RSCH. 939, 946 (2015).
35 Patrick Oppmann & Maegan Vazquez, Trump Admin Imposes New Travel Restrictions on Cuba,
Banning Cruise Ships, CNN (June 4, 2019, 1:25 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/04/politics/uscuba-travel-restrictions/index.html [https://perma.cc/C6C7-V2P4] (summarizing new restrictions
on travel to Cuba imposed by the Trump Administration).
36 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
37 DIANNE R. RENNACK & MARK P. SULLIVAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44822, CUBA
SANCTIONS: LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS LIMITING THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS
(2018) (discussing the Cuban Democracy Act and the LIBERTAD Act).
38 Id. at 1 n.2.
39 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001–05 (restricting the entry of vessels carrying goods in which Cuba or
Cuban nationals have an interest into U.S. ports without authorization and requiring the President
to establish “strict limits on remittances to Cuba”).
40 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021–37 (strengthening the U.S. embargo against Cuba by expanding the scope
and territorial application of sanctions).
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these statutes allow the Executive to suspend or waive aspects of the embargo
imposed by Congress after the Executive makes particular ﬁndings.41
The Helms-Burton Act, in particular, is notable because it allows U.S.
nationals whose property was conﬁscated by the Cuban government to sue
for damages from any entity that traﬃcs in or beneﬁts from traﬃcking in that
property.42 This statute thereby discourages foreign corporations from
entering into a variety of transactions with the Cuban government.43 These
“[s]econdary sanctions” reﬂect Congress’s eﬀort to expand the embargo’s
eﬀectiveness and further harm Cuba.44 Still, in doing so they also increase
the embargo’s costs on others, burdening foreign businesses and U.S.
businesses that would like to engage in commerce with Cuba. The
extraterritorial aspect of the embargo has created frictions with allies, which
resist the application of U.S. law to their companies when those companies
lack signiﬁcant jurisdictional contacts with the United States.45 Further, the
threat of these lawsuits limits the foreign companies’ activities.46 The hostile
reception by U.S. allies to secondary sanctions oﬀers an important caution
for new forms of economic statecraft that aﬀect third parties.

41 See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. §§ 6033(b), 6064 (allowing the President to suspend prohibition on
foreign aid only if he determines that a “transition government in Cuba is in power”); 22 U.S.C.
§ 6085(b)(1) (allowing the President to suspend Helms-Burton litigation for up to six months); 22
U.S.C. § 6007(a) (allowing the President to waive restrictions on vessels if, among other things,
Cuba conducts free and fair elections and takes certain other steps to protect human rights).
42 Brice M. Clagett, Title III of the Helms-Burton Act is Consistent with International Law, 90 AM.
J. INT’L L. 434, 434 (1996).
43 See id. (describing foreign corporations as the principal traﬃckers and targets of the law);
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, tit. III, Pub. L. No. 104-114,
110 Stat. 785 (codiﬁed in scattered titles and sections of U.S.C.).
44 John J. Forrer & Kathleen Harrington, The Trump Administration’s Use of Trade Tariﬀs as
Economic Sanctions, CESIFO F., Winter 2019, at 23, 23 (“Secondary sanctions are a tool designed to
push foreign countries, companies, and individuals into halting business dealings with countries and
entities on which primary economic sanctions have been imposed.” (citation omitted)).
45 On the unpopularity of secondary sanctions enforcement, see Tom Ruys & Cedric Ryngaert,
Secondary Sanctions: A Weapon Out of Control? The International Legality of, and European Responses to,
US Secondary Sanctions, BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. (Sept. 22, 2020), https://academic.oup.com/
bybil/advance-article/doi/10.1093/bybil/braa007/5909823 [https://perma.cc/W6VB-8L8A]. See also
id. (“The Helms-Burton Act’s far-reaching private enforcement right, which threatened investments
in Cuba by EU Member States, was a particular thorn in the EU’s side.”).
46 Monroe Leigh, The Political Consequences of Economic Embargoes, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 74, 7576 (1995) (giving examples of litigation challenging application of the U.S. embargo). Section 306(b)
of the Helms-Burton Act allows the Executive to suspend the application of the expropriation
litigation provision. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 § 306(b).
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c. Critiques
Complaints about the extraterritorial application of embargoes are just
one of a range of critiques they face. As former U.S. State Department Legal
Adviser Monroe Leigh noted,
The catalog of criticisms of economic embargoes is lengthy and
substantial. We read scholarly articles proving that they seldom achieve their
declared objectives; that they deny trading opportunities to enterprises in the
embargo-imposing country; that they bestow windfall proﬁts on thirdcountry traders; that economic embargoes are inherently illegal; that they
despoil the poor and enrich the wealthy; that they fail to unseat the dictatorial
regimes; that they are inherently immoral; [and] that in American practice
they almost always include extreme assertions of extraterritorial
jurisdiction . . . .47

Embargoes may also cast the state imposing the embargo in a bad light.
If the embargo succeeds, critics may view it as draconian; if it fails, critics
may view the state imposing the embargo as feckless.
2. Economic Sanctions
Compared to embargoes, targeted sanctions represent a more tailored
approach to foreign targets. Sanctions can reach not only foreign governments
but also foreign officials, foreign nationals, or non-state groups such as alQaeda and Hezbollah.48 Sanctions commonly take the form of asset freezes,
travel bans, and arms embargoes,49 and have become a preferred policy tool
because they allow states to respond to a national security threat or foreign
policy challenges without necessarily resorting to military force.50 The United
States has used sanctions to promote a range of foreign policy goals, including
“counterterrorism, counternarcotics, nonproliferation, democracy and human
rights promotion, conflict resolution, and cybersecurity.”51

Leigh, supra note 46, at 74.
For a comprehensive list of U.S. economic sanctions, see Sanctions Programs and Country
Information, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/
Programs/Pages/Programs.aspx [https://perma.cc/J348-BKV4] (listing OFAC sanctions).
49 See Jonathan Masters, What Are Economic Sanctions?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS.,
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-are-economic-sanctions [https://perma.cc/A8ZH-5VM2]
(Aug. 12, 2019, 8:00 AM).
50 Forrer & Harrington, supra note 44, at 23 (“Economic sanctions have become a go-to foreign
policy tool to support [the Trump Administration’s] ‘America First’ foreign policy strategy.”).
51 Masters, supra note 49.
47
48
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a. History
Like trade embargoes, U.S. sanctions have a long history. For example,
during the Civil War, Congress “prohibited transactions with the
Confederacy, [and] called for the forfeiture of goods involved in such
transactions . . . .”52 During World War II, the Treasury’s Oﬃce of Foreign
Funds Control (today, the Oﬃce of Foreign Assets Control or OFAC) helped
prevent the Nazis from using the assets they seized in occupied states.
Treasury also blocked enemy assets and prohibited foreign trade with the Axis
Powers.53 And during the Korean War, the United States froze Chinese and
North Korean assets.54
After the severe sanctions that the UN Security Council imposed on Iraq
in 1990–1991,55 states and scholars developed an interest in so-called “smart
sanctions”—sanctions that are narrowly tailored to their target’s
objectionable behavior and limit the collateral impact on the target country’s
population.56 As an example of the type of smart sanctions common today,
consider U.S. sanctions on individuals who contributed to a spate of violence
in Burundi. In a 2015 Executive Order (EO), President Obama blocked the
property and entry into the United States of four individuals from Burundi,
including a former Defense Minister and the sitting Minister of Public
Security.57 He also authorized the government to freeze the assets of
individuals in Burundi whom the U.S. Secretaries of State and Treasury
determine to be responsible for human rights abuses, acts of violence against
civilians, and the use of child soldiers.58
b. Statutory Authorities and Implementation
The authority for U.S. sanctions ﬂows from Congress’s foreign
Commerce Clause power. Sanctions statutes take two primary forms: general
authorizing statutes such as the International Emergency Economic Powers

52 OFAC Consolidated Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. D EP’T OF THE T REASURY,
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/frequently-asked-questions/ofacconsolidated-frequently-asked-questions [https://perma.cc/BBY5-EP3E].
53 Id.
54 Richard T. Devane, The United States and China: China’s Claims and Assets, 18 ASIAN SUR.
1267, 1267 (1978); see also Proclamation No. 2914, 3 C.F.R. 71 (Supp. 1950) (proclaiming a national
emergency during the Korean War).
55 S.C. Res. 661 (Aug. 6, 1990); S.C. Res. 687 (Apr. 3, 1991).
56 Joseph Stephanides, Foreword, in SMART SANCTIONS: TARGETING ECONOMIC
STATECRAFT vii, vii (David Cortright & George A. Lopez eds., 2002) (deﬁning smart sanctions as
measures tailored to maximize a target regime’s costs of noncompliance while minimizing the
suﬀering of that state’s population).
57 Exec. Order No. 13,712, 3 C.F.R. 2015 Comp. 381, 384.
58 Id. at 381.
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Act (IEEPA)59 and speciﬁc sanctions statutes such as the Magnitsky Act60
and the 2017 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
(CAATSA).61 IEEPA authorizes the President to impose sanctions when
they ﬁnd that a situation constitutes “any unusual and extraordinary threat,
which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to
the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States” and
declare a “national emergency” to deal with that threat.62 After the President
issues an EO making such a ﬁnding, the Treasury Department issues
regulations that detail the prohibited transactions, the eﬀects of violating
those provisions, and the deﬁnitions of terms in the EO.63
Although we refer to the “government” imposing sanctions, many of the
actors that prevent targets from accessing assets, weapons, oil, vessels, or
travel are private corporations. Because today’s economic sanctions target a
wide range of actors across countries and industries, many corporations must
set up systems to avoid doing business with actors on the sanctions list.64
Companies must also ensure that their supply chains and counterparties are
not doing business with sanctioned targets.65 As discussed in the next Section,
these burdens impact business and investment decisions by companies that
must comply with them.66
For example, the Treasury Department’s sanctions enforcement eﬀorts
have “led to many large ﬁnancial institutions reassessing the value of
providing correspondent banking services on a global basis.”67 Corporations
now view the risk of sanctions enforcement as both a substantial cost and a
potential black eye to their reputations.68 In addition to the compliance costs
that companies must incur and the ﬁnes accompanying violations, sanctions
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a).
Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-208, 126 Stat.
1502 (codiﬁed at 22 U.S.C. § 5811).
61 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, Pub. L. No. 115-44, 131 Stat. 886
(2017) (codiﬁed at 22 U.S.C. § 9401).
62 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a).
63 See, e.g., International Emergency Economic Powers Act Civil and Criminal Penalties, 73
Fed. Reg. 32650 (June 10, 2008) (to be codiﬁed at 31 C.F.R. pts. 535–95).
64 See OFAC Issues a Framework for Compliance Commitments, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (May
2, 2019), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm680 [https://perma.cc/2TBK-HRDG].
65 See Mengqi Sun, U.S. Sanctions Compliance Fines Hit Decade High, WALL ST. J. (July 25,
2019, 8:32 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-sanctions-compliance-fines-hit-decade-high11564057920 [https://perma.cc/7TD7-YH59] (“OFAC has been where the actions have been in
terms of potential risk to global institutions doing transactions all over the world . . . .” (quoting
Doug Davison, partner, Linklaters LLP)).
66 See generally PIERRE-HUGUES VERDIER, GLOBAL BANKS ON TRIAL: U.S. PROSECUTIONS
AND THE REMAKING OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE (2020).
67 RICHARD GORDON, MICHAEL SMYTH & TOM CORNELL, SANCTIONS LAW § 11.55 (2019).
68 See Sun, supra note 65 (noting that OFAC issued $1.3 billion in penalties between January
and July 2019 for sanctions violations).
59
60

2022]

Tax Law as Foreign Policy

289

may deter companies from pursuing lucrative business opportunities, such as
selling oil or providing shipping services to foreign actors.69 At some point,
requiring banks with a U.S. nexus to enforce U.S. sanctions may compel them
to avoid the U.S. market entirely.
c. Critiques
Critics have identiﬁed an array of problems with both the theory and
implementation of sanctions. Sanctions are only occasionally eﬀective.70 Part
of this is because the United States sometimes imposes sanctions without
understanding the dynamics of foreign economies.71 Sanctions create scarcity,
which can bolster the revenues of authoritarian regimes that exert tight
control over goods.72 Further, imposing sanctions on a foreign government
oﬀers that regime a scapegoat, allowing the regime to blame others for its
troubles.73 Even smart sanctions may impose costs on the general population
in the target state, as when arms embargoes divert the government’s spending
on social services to cover the higher cost of acquiring weapons.74 When U.S.
sanctions harm local populations, it can increase anti-American sentiment in
the target state.75
Another critique is that sanctions are sometimes adopted for domestic
political reasons rather than for valid foreign policy reasons. Former U.S.
Deputy Treasury Secretary Stuart Eizenstat argues that congressionally
driven sanctions tend to be “driven by domestic political pressures” and can
be counterproductive when they lack “the flexibility needed to make

69 See, e.g., Jonathan Saul & Parisa Hafezi, Shipping Firms Shy Away From Iran Despite Deal to Ease
Sanctions, REUTERS (May 28, 2014, 11:20 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/iran-shippingtrade/shipping-firms-shy-away-from-iran-despite-deal-to-ease-sanctions-idUSL6N0OD31H20140528
[https://perma.cc/F66X-5XZB].
70 See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT & BARBARA
OEGG, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (3d ed. 2007) (discussing poor design and
implementation of sanctions). Broad-based sanctions have been most eﬀective when the goal is to
destabilize a foreign regime. Financial sanctions are most eﬀective when the goal is policy change.
See generally id.; Jaleh Dashti-Gibson, Patricia Davis & Benjamin Radcliﬀ, On the Determinants of the
Success of Economic Sanctions: An Empirical Analysis, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 608 (1997).
71 See Daniel W. Drezner, How Smart are Smart Sanctions?, 5 INT’L STUDS. REV. 107, 107 (2003)
(book review).
72 Id. at 108-09.
73 See, e.g., Iran Blames U.S. Sanctions for Vaccine Payment Problems, REUTERS (Nov. 13, 2020,
10:34 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-iran/iran-blames-u-s-sanctionsfor-vaccine-payment-problems-idUSKBN27T26H [https://perma.cc/Y6E6-ZMX8].
74 Drezner, supra note 71, at 108.
75 See, e.g., Aresu Eqbali & Asa Fitch, On Eve of New Sanctions, Iranian Regime Whips Up AntiAmerican Anger, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 4, 2018, 9:46 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/on-eve-of-new-us-sanctions-iranian-regime-whips-up-anti-american-anger-1541342802 [https://perma.cc/5RWJ-PJ5B].
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sanctions effective.”76 Others note that sanctions are easier to impose than
to lift, which diminishes the incentives for the targets of sanctions to change
their behavior.77
Foreign actors are not the only ones who bear the costs of sanctions.
Sanctions reduce the sales revenues and business opportunities of U.S.
companies. Further, as noted above, many U.S. businesses must develop
costly sanctions compliance regimes, extending the compliance burden
beyond ﬁnancial institutions to shipping, manufacturing, and technology
companies.78 Moreover, the reach of U.S. sanctions means that not only U.S.
companies but also multinational and foreign companies must worry about
sanctions compliance.79
B. National Security-Driven Tariﬀs
Although tariﬀs—taxes that a state imposes on imported foreign goods—
are generally used for economic purposes such as altering the terms of trade
with foreign countries, the United States also employs tariﬀs to advance its
foreign policy and national security interests. For example, tariﬀs can help
ensure that strategically important goods are sourced domestically, which may
be necessary if relationships with trading partners deteriorate. States may
also use tariﬀs to inﬂict economic harm on foreign states, creating leverage to
persuade foreign states to change their policies. As with sanctions, some
scholars criticize tariﬀs for inﬂicting economic harm on the United States
without achieving their intended goals.80 This critique has particular bite

76 Stuart E. Eizenstat, Book Review, 23 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 377, 380 (2004)
(reviewing MEGHAN L. O’SULLIVAN, SHREWD SANCTIONS: STATECRAFT AND STATE
SPONSORS OF TERRORISM (2003)); id. (citing as an example sanctions on India and Pakistan that
hurt U.S. companies without providing beneﬁts).
77 One extreme example of this is the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974. The
amendment prevented the President from waiving the unfavorable trade treatment of communist
countries unless a ﬁnding was made about the emigration policies of those countries. The
amendment remained applicable to Russia until 2012, more than twenty years after the collapse of
the U.S.S.R. in 1991. For background, see Robert H. Bradner, The Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade
Act of 1974: Soviet Progress on Emigration Reform Is Insufficient to Merit a Waiver, 4 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
639, 658-59 (1990), and The Collapse of the Soviet Union, OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/collapse-soviet-union [https://perma.cc/AU94-NBH6].
78 See Kristin Broughton, U.S. Sanctions Compliance Weighs on Nonfinancial Companies, WALL
ST. J. (Nov. 19, 2019, 5:28 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-sanctions-compliance-weighs-onnonﬁnancial-companies-11574202523 [https://perma.cc/WU7P-UWLF] (discussing the impacts of
sanctions on global supply chains).
79 Id.
80 See, e.g., ERICA YORK, TAX FOUND., THE IMPACT OF TRADE ON TARIFFS ON THE
UNITED STATES (2018), https://ﬁles.taxfoundation.org/20180627113002/Tax-Foundation-FF5951.pdf [https://perma.cc/6S3D-NCYF].
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because tariﬀs are collected from U.S. importers, who often pass on their
increased costs to their U.S. customers.81
1. History
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, U.S. economic policy
was mercantilist, pursuing large trade surpluses that allowed it to accumulate
foreign ﬁnancial assets.82 The federal government relied heavily on tariﬀs
both for revenue and to protect domestic industries. Thus, when Congress
enacted the Smoot-Hawley Tariﬀ Act, it focused on the purported economic
beneﬁts.83 But the Smoot-Hawley tariﬀs proved disastrous. Domestically, the
tariﬀs exacerbated the Great Depression and made imported goods
unaﬀordable for most people.84 Internationally, the tariﬀs prompted
retaliation by other states against American exports.85
Following World War II, U.S. economic policy moved in a liberal
direction towards free movements of capital, goods, and labor. Congress
enacted trade statutes authorizing the President to enter into free trade
agreements and lower duties on foreign goods.86 Internationally, the United
States and other states concluded the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and
Trade (GATT), a treaty that “removed states’ ability to discriminate against
one another in an eﬀort to protect the domestic economy.”87 The World Trade
Organization (WTO) succeeded the GATT in 1995.88 In general, the U.S.
Trade Representative today seeks to reduce trade restrictions.89
Bucking these broader historical trends, the Trump Administration
revived a range of tariﬀs on adversaries and allies, both for domestic economic

81 Who Pays Trump’s Tariﬀs, China or U.S. Customers and Companies?, REUTERS (May 21, 2019,
11:45 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-tariﬀs-explainer-idUSKCN1SR1UI
[http://perma.cc/8P2J-4NPN].
82 See Janeen M. Klinger, Political Economy and National Security: A Primer, in I THEORY OF
WAR AND STRATEGY 235, 236-42 (J. Boone Bartholomees ed., 2008) (discussing mercantilism’s
approach to improving global economic power).
83 See DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, PEDDLING PROTECTIONISM: SMOOT-HAWLEY AND THE
GREAT DEPRESSION 145 (2011) (describing Congress’s motivations in passing tariﬀs).
84 Alan Reynolds, The Smoot-Hawley Tariff and the Great Depression, CATO INST. (May 7, 2016, 3:27
PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/smoot-hawley-tariff-great-depression [https://perma.cc/4LMT-C39F].
85 IRWIN, supra note 83 at 183.
86 See Kathleen Claussen, Trade’s Security Exceptionalism, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1097, 1112 (2020)
(describing Congress’s delegation of trade negotiations to the Executive).
87 Ari Aﬁlalo & Dennis Patterson, Statecraft, Trade and the Order of States, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L.
725, 737 (2006).
88 See Klinger, supra note 82, at 243 (detailing the creation of the WTO).
89 See Non-Tariﬀ Barriers and Regulatory Issues, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/transatlantic-trade-and-investmentpartnership-t-tip/t-tip-2 [https://perma.cc/ST8Y-GXMF].
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purposes and as a foreign policy tool.90 In particular, President Trump levied
high-proﬁle tariﬀs on China both to counteract the domestic displacement of
U.S. workers91 and because China has become “our No. 1 geopolitical
opponent.”92 This consideration of tariﬀs alongside targeted sanctions
represented a pronounced shift from prior practice, which reﬂected the view
that sanctions were a foreign policy tool and tariﬀs were not. The Trump
Administration applied tariﬀs to historical allies too. After U.S. tensions with
Iran escalated in 2019–2020, the Trump Administration “privately threatened
large automobile tariﬀs on European countries if they didn’t call out Tehran
for alleged violations of the 2015 nuclear deal that Trump ha[d] sought to
dismantle.”93 One European oﬃcial described Trump’s eﬀort to inﬂuence
European foreign policy through tariﬀs as “[e]xtortion,”94 evidencing the
international political costs and reputational downside of using tariﬀs against
foreign companies to pressure foreign governments.
2. Statutory Authorities and Implementation
Congress has delegated a range of trade authorities to the Executive. Two
key U.S. statutes that the President can use to adjust tariﬀs accommodate
national security considerations. Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 allows
the President to impose temporary tariﬀs when a sudden increase in the
import of a given product threatens U.S. industries; it directs the President
to consider the “national security interests” of the United States when
choosing what safeguards to apply.95 Similarly, section 232 of the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962 allows the President to raise tariﬀs on goods if those
90 As one article noted, “The Trump administration’s enthusiasm for economic sanctions
has been reflected in [its] equally passionate embrace of trade tariffs.” Forrer & Harrington,
supra note 44, at 23; see also id. (describing the “re-purposing of trade tariffs as economic
sanctions” as “unprecedented”).
91 Adam Behsudi & Finbarr Bermingham, Trump Thinks Tariﬀs Will Add U.S. Manufacturing
Jobs. Economic Reality Says They Won’t, POLITICO (Aug. 21, 2019, 5:01 AM), https://
www.politico.com/story/2019/08/21/trump-tariﬀs-bikes-manufacturing-1470361 [https://perma.cc/
QG8F-Y4R3] (“President Donald Trump had promised that his steep tariﬀs on Chinese goods
would help bring jobs back to the U.S.”).
92 Keith Johnson, ‘Most People Don’t Know What a Tariﬀ Is’, FOREIGN POL’Y (May 29, 2019,
4:10 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/29/most-people-dont-know-what-a-tariﬀ-is [https://
perma.cc/T62F-FRCS]; see also Geoﬀrey Gertz, Did Trump’s Tariﬀs Benefit American Workers and
National Security?, BROOKINGS (Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/votervital/
did-trumps-tariffs-benefit-american-workers-and-national-security [https://perma.cc/C7VG-2PR8].
93 Anne Gearan & John Hudson, Trump’s Strong-Arm Foreign Policy Tactics Create Tensions with
U.S. Friends and Foes, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
trumps-strong-arm-foreign-policy-tactics-create-tensions-with-both-us-friends-and-foes/2020/01/18/
ddb76364-3991-11ea-bb7b-265f4554af6d_story.html [https://perma.cc/5MG9-6BK6].
94 Id.
95 Claussen, supra note 86, at 1122.
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goods are “being imported into the United States in such quantities or under
such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security.”96
Historically, presidents invoked their section 232 powers infrequently and
primarily did so when they were worried about U.S. dependence on foreign
oil.97 In a few cases, however, the President invoked this authority to punish
foreign governments. In 1979, President Carter used section 232 to limit oil
exports from Iran to retaliate for the seizure of the U.S. hostages,98 and in
1980 he exercised his authority under the EAA to impose a grain embargo on
the U.S.S.R. to punish it for its occupation of Afghanistan.99 The Trump
Administration deployed section 232 more aggressively than its predecessors.
The Department of Commerce, which initiates investigations under section
232 to determine whether imports pose a national security threat, conducted
ﬁve investigations and concluded in each case that the import in question
threatened U.S. national security.100
If the Executive wishes to impose a discriminatory tariﬀ today that is
consistent with U.S. international obligations, it must invoke a policy
exception in the GATT.101 Article XXI of the GATT recognizes a national
security exception to its general commitment to lowering trade barriers if the
state considers an action
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests
(i) relating to ﬁssionable materials or the materials from which they are
derived;
(ii) relating to the traﬃc in arms, ammunition and implements of war
and to such traﬃc in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or
indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment; [or]
19 U.S.C. § 1862.
See Linfan Zha, The Wall on Trade: Reconsidering the Boundary of Section 232 Authority Under
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 29 MINN. J. INT’L L. 229, 253-54 (2020) (showing that there were
only twenty-six investigations under section 232 prior to the Trump Administration); RACHEL F.
FEFER, KEIGH E. HAMMOND, VIVIAN C. JONES, BRANDON J. MURRILL, MICHAELA D. PLATZER
& BROCK R. WILLIAMS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45249, SECTION 232 INVESTIGATIONS:
OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 3 (2021) (detailing that the President took action in ﬁve
cases regarding crude oil and petroleum products); id. at app. B (providing a complete list of section
232 investigations).
98 Craig Anderson Lewis, Waiting for the Big One: Principle, Policy, and the Restriction of Imports
under Section 232, 22 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 357, 389 (1991) (“President Carter imposed an
embargo on oil imports from Iran in retaliation for the seizure of American hostages.”).
99 The embargo was an economic and political failure. See generally Robert L. Paarlberg, Lessons
of the Grain Embargo, 59 FOREIGN AFFS. 144 (1980).
100 See FEFER ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 97, at app. B, tbl. B-1 (detailing the
ﬁve section 232 investigations that the Commerce Department undertook during the Trump
Administration that were completed and listing two more initiated in 2020 that had not been
resolved as of May 18, 2021 when the report was last updated).
101 See discussion infra Section IV.E.
96
97
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(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international
relations . . . .102

As we discuss in Part IV, this exception will be crucial in enabling the United
States to use federal income tax law for foreign policy purposes.103
When tariﬀs are in place on particular goods, importers must calculate
what they owe under the tariﬀ schedules and pay the duties to U.S. Customs
and Border Protection after their shipments clear customs.104 The burden of
the administrative processes around tariﬀs is thus shared between importing
companies, which must keep themselves informed about current tariﬀ rules
and pay the correct tariﬀ amounts, and the government, which sets the tariﬀs,
processes and reviews the payments, and enforces compliance.
3. Critiques
The Trump Administration’s tariffs have been criticized for multiple
reasons. Critics note that U.S. companies typically pass along tariff costs
to their customers or cut costs, including by reducing jobs and wages.105 A
study by the Federal Reserve and Columbia University found that “U.S.
companies and consumers paid $3 billion a month in additional taxes
because of tariffs on Chinese goods and on aluminum and steel from
around the globe.”106 U.S. businesses such as soybean growers lost business
because of China’s retaliatory tariffs.107 As a legal matter, a panel of the
Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO concluded that the U.S. tariffs
against China violated the GATT because they did not fit into the national
security exception.108 In sum, tariffs are typically a blunt instrument that
imposes high costs on U.S. stakeholders and that may be inconsistent with
U.S. treaty obligations.
102 General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade, art. XXI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A11, 55 U.N.T.S.
188 [hereinafter GATT 1947].
103 See discussion infra Part IV.
104 See Brent Radcliﬀe, The Basics of Tariﬀs and Trade Barriers, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 27, 2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/08/tariﬀ-trade-barrier-basics.asp#who-collects-atariﬀ [https://perma.cc/B67X-K2RF].
105 See Howard Gleckman, What Is a Tariff and Who Pays It?, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Sept. 25, 2018),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/what-tariff-and-who-pays-it [https://perma.cc/RFD3-4WVZ].
106 Who Pays Trump’s Tariﬀs, China or U.S. Customers and Companies?, supra note 81.
107 See id. (“Chinese buyers have cut billions of dollars of soybean purchases from the United
States because China’s tariﬀs have made U.S. supplies more expensive than beans from competitors
such as Brazil.”).
108 See Panel Report, United States—Tariﬀ Measures on Certain Goods from China, ¶ 7.238, WTO
Doc. WT/DS543/R 64 (adopted Sept. 15, 2020) (“[T]he Panel concludes that the United States has
not provided an explanation that demonstrates how the imposition of additional duties on the
selected imported products contributes to the achievement of the public morals objective as invoked
by the United States.”).
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C. Export Controls
A third way that the United States conducts economic statecraft is by
regulating the export of items that may threaten national security. By
controlling the sale of sensitive U.S.-made goods and services such as
weapons, military training, and dual-use technologies, the United States can
help ensure that hostile foreign states cannot use those goods or services
against it or use those tools to perpetrate acts that the United States
condemns, such as human rights violations or war crimes. Although many of
these regulations have a direct connection to U.S. national security, critics
variously characterize the export control regime as “too restrictive,
insuﬃciently restrictive, cumbersome, obsolete, ineﬃcient, or any
combination of these descriptions.”109
1. History
The United States has long used export controls during wartime.110 In the
middle of the twentieth century, export controls became a peacetime
undertaking, with Congress enacting the Export Control Act of 1949 (ECA)
to address the need for a comprehensive peacetime export control regime.111
The ECA authorized the President to implement export controls based on
“national security, foreign policy, or for the eﬀect of domestic exports on the
national economy,” and the President imposed near-embargo levels of
controls on the Soviet bloc and China.112 Congress enacted a replacement
statute, the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA), to reﬂect the détente
in U.S.–Soviet relations, shifting the emphasis away from highly restrictive
controls to promote exports, including to communist countries.113 The basic
function of the EAA was to provide “the statutory authority for export
controls on sensitive dual-use goods and technologies: items that have both
civilian and military applications.”114 Export controls under the EAA also
applied to the re-export of U.S.-origin items from one foreign country to
another, thus extending U.S. jurisdiction to transactions that took place

FERGUSSON & KERR, CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 16, at 1.
See generally Harold J. Berman & John R. Garson, United States Export Controls—Past,
Present, and Future, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 791, 791 n.1 (1967) (discussing the use of export controls
during both World Wars).
111 IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL31832, THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION
ACT: EVOLUTION, PROVISIONS, AND DEBATE 1-2 (2009); 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2021–32.
112 FERGUSSON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 111, at 1-2, 7.
113 Gregory W. Bowman, A Prescription for Curing US Export Controls, 97 MARQ. L. REV.
599, 615 (2013).
114 FERGUSSON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 111, at Summary.
109
110
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abroad among non-U.S. persons.115 Congress did not update the EAA until
2018, when it enacted the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA).116 The core
disagreement about reforming the EAA centered on striking the right balance
between national security interests and commercial interests.117 In the end,
the ECRA made few changes to the old regime.118
One prominent recent use of export controls for national security
purposes involves Chinese telecommunications companies such as Huawei119
and ZTE. In 2016, the Commerce Department placed ZTE on its “Entity
List,” which occurs when a company has engaged in “activities contrary to the
national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.”120
Sometimes known as a “death sentence,”121 being placed on the Entity List
means that the Commerce Department will presumptively deny licenses to
U.S. companies that seek to export goods to the listed company.122 In 2019,
the Commerce Department added Huawei to the Entity List, citing Huawei’s
involvement in violations of IEEPA and other U.S. laws in a manner contrary
to U.S. national security and foreign policy.123 In December 2020, the
Pentagon added four Chinese companies to a list of entities judged to support
the Communist Party’s People’s Liberation Army,124 provoking claims that
the United States was using national security as a cover to throttle the
development of foreign industrial competition. Even more recent attempts
to add Chinese companies to this blacklist have run up against court

115 Bowman, supra note 113, at 606 (“As a result, the United States is now far more inclined to
assert jurisdiction extraterritorially . . . .”).
116 Export Control Reform Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-232, 132 Stat. 2208 (codiﬁed in
scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
117 See Danny Vinik, America’s Permanent Export Emergency, POLITICO (Oct. 22, 2017, 4:22
PM), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/08/22/america-permanent-export-emergency000501 [https://perma.cc/SH7M-GYYP] (noting that export administration reform created “huge
political ﬁghts between pro-business lawmakers seeking to open up new markets and defense hawks
worried about permitting the sale of sensitive technologies”).
118 The law did provide permanent statutory authority for the Commerce Department’s export
control program and its Export Administration Regulations. 50 U.S.C. § 4801.
119 15 C.F.R. § 744 supp. 4 (2021).
120 Id.; id. § 744.1(a)(1).
121 Zak Doﬀman, U.S. Senators Target Huawei With ‘Death Sentence’ Law to Block Trump’s
Backtrack, FORBES (July 16, 2019, 2:33 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoﬀman/2019/07/16/us-senators-introduce-huawei-death-sentence-bill-to-put-blacklisting-into-law/?sh=749c83847867
[https://perma.cc/5BHT-25GF].
122 See Lists of Parties of Concern, BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., https://www.bis.doc.gov/
index.php/policy-guidance/lists-of-parties-of-concern [https://perma.cc/6QAT-BGVK].
123 15 C.F.R. § 744 supp. 4 (2021).
124 Joe McDonald, US Adds Chinese Chipmaker, Oil Giant to Security Blacklist, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Dec. 4, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-donald-trump-technology-beijingchina-987af9f977098906f5d71b9ef325b85f [ https://perma.cc/7P82-GPJ3].
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challenges, with the D.C. District Court issuing a preliminary injunction
against the listing of those companies.125
2. Statutory Authorities and Implementation
The U.S. export control regime is a complex web of statutes and
regulations. The Departments of Commerce, State, and Treasury are the
primary agencies that implement, administer, and enforce export
regulations.126 Each department is responsible for a diﬀerent type of export,
but their jurisdiction sometimes overlaps.
The 1976 Arms Export Control Act (AECA) gives the President the
power to control the export of defense articles and services.127 The State
Department administers this statute through its International Traﬃc in Arms
Regulations (ITAR),128 which overlaps with the U.S. sanctions regime by
denying export licenses to states under UN export sanctions, state sponsors
of terrorism, and states subject to a U.S. arms embargo or sanction.129 The
second key statute is the ECRA, which gives the President the power to
control the “export, reexport, and in-country transfer of items subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States,” whether by U.S. or foreign nationals.130
Although the Commerce Department administers the Export Administration
Regulations (EAR), U.S. companies bear primary responsibility for
determining whether an export transaction requires a license.131 This
determination can be diﬃcult because of the regulations’ complexity and
imperfect overlap with the U.S. sanctions regime administered by the
Treasury Department.
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)
can also be understood as an export control regime, although it formally
regulates inbound investments. In 1988, Congress authorized the President
to suspend or prohibit certain transactions, including mergers or acquisitions,
that could result in foreign control of any U.S. business, as well as certain
types of real estate.132 Congress later broadened the statute’s coverage to
extend to certain other non-controlling investments that give foreign persons
125 Jordan Brunner, Communist Chinese Military Companies and Section 1237: A Primer, LAWFARE
(Mar. 22, 2021, 8:01 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/communist-chinese-military-companiesand-section-1237-primer [https://perma.cc/SDC7-KVDA] (“[T]wo Chinese companies have ﬁled
lawsuits contesting their designation as ‘Communist Chinese military companies . . . .’”).
126 U.S. Export Controls, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., https://www.trade.gov/us-export-controls
[https://perma.cc/RY22-9YTD].
127 22 U.S.C. § 2751.
128 22 C.F.R. § 120 (2021).
129 22 C.F.R. § 126.1 (2021).
130 50 U.S.C. § 4812(a)(1).
131 See generally 15 C.F.R. § 732 (2021) (listing companies’ obligations under EAR).
132 50 U.S.C. § 4565.
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“access, rights, or involvement in certain types of U.S. businesses.”133 CFIUS
therefore eﬀectively restricts the export of certain types of sensitive
information to foreign actors. Through an Executive Order, the President
established CFIUS, a committee of nine cabinet members from federal
agencies and oﬃces, to review covered transactions and assess their potential
eﬀect on U.S. national security.134 If CFIUS concludes that the transaction
poses a national security risk, it can request that the parties to the transaction
take steps to mitigate that risk135 or even recommend that the President block
the transaction entirely.136
As these statutes reveal, a range of federal agencies presides over the
export control regime. The Departments of State, Defense, Energy, and
Commerce all play roles that intersect and, in some cases, overlap. There has
long been interest in trying to consolidate and simplify the export control
process.137 In 2010, then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates proposed a new
export control system that would involve a single export control licensing
agency; a single control list; a single enforcement structure; and a single
information technology system.138 Although the idea did not get traction,
dissatisfaction with the current system remains.139
3. Critiques
The critiques of the U.S. export control regime are both substantive and
procedural. Substantively, many businesses believe that the United States
imposes too many controls on U.S. exports. Others argue that because the
133 CFIUS Laws and Guidance, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/
policy-issues/international/the-committee-on-foreign-investment-in-the-united-states-cﬁus/cﬁuslaws-and-guidance [https://perma.cc/MA4T-9HZK].
134 50 U.S.C. § 4565(b)(1); Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 990 (1971–1975), reprinted as
amended by Exec. Order No. 13,456, 3 C.F.R. 171 (2008).
135 Exec. Order No. 11,858, § 7, 3 C.F.R. 990 (1971–1975), reprinted as amended by Exec. Order
No. 13,456, 3 C.F.R. 171 (2008).
136 Id. § 6. Changes made in 2018 established exceptions to the process for companies with
suﬃcient ties to “excepted foreign state[s].” 31 C.F.R. § 800.219 (2021) (implementing the Foreign
Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018). These states are Australia, Canada, and the
United Kingdom. CFIUS Excepted Foreign States, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/the-committee-on-foreign-investment-inthe-united-states-cﬁus/cﬁus-excepted-foreign-states [https://perma.cc/R56G-SVE2]. The 2018
amendments also allow CFIUS reviews to discriminate against investors from countries of “special
concern.” JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33388, THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 2 (2019).
137 Berman & Garson, supra note 110, at 794 (“[W]e do not wish to conceal our conviction . . .
that our system of export controls needs a drastic revision.”).
138 Robert M. Gates, Sec’y of Def., Address to the Business Executives for National Security
on the U.S. Export Control System (Apr. 20, 2010), https://sgp.fas.org/news/2010/04/gatesexport.html [https://perma.cc/882D-4A68].
139 See Egle, supra note 13.
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existing multilateral export control regimes are voluntary, it is easy for actors
to get their hands on dangerous items from other states. Procedurally, it is
hard to gainsay that the regime is unwieldy, complex, and costly for
companies to comply with.
As is true with sanctions and tariﬀs, export controls entail a range of
tradeoﬀs. The use of export controls to deprive a foreign state of access to a
certain type of goods (such as arms or advanced lasers) might prompt the
foreign government to develop its own industry. Further, export controls
deprive U.S. companies of sales. Export controls can have indirect eﬀects as
well, if U.S. companies lose sales to companies in states that currently use
U.S. technology but want to keep selling their products to states that the
United States has blocked from receiving that technology.
Although CFIUS is a powerful tool for protecting U.S. companies and
infrastructure from being purchased or controlled by foreign companies or
governments in a way that could pose a threat to U.S. national security, the
tool is only available for use in a narrow set of business transactions. That
said, CFIUS seems to have high salience (in situations such as the Dubai
Ports case),140 and the trend seems to be to empower CFIUS with ever
broader mandates.141 As with sanctions and tariﬀs, in those cases where
CFIUS imposes risk mitigation measures or where the President bars a
transaction, the aﬀected U.S. business may suﬀer signiﬁcant ﬁnancial harm.
D. Recent Trends
Although embargoes, economic sanctions, tariﬀs, and export controls
comprise the bulk of coercive U.S. economic statecraft, the Trump
Administration employed (or contemplated using) several new tools that
might serve similar purposes. The increasing range of economic tools being
deployed for foreign policy purposes makes it even more puzzling that tax
has not been among those tools.
One new tool is import restrictions. The United States is concerned that
using Chinese products within U.S. critical infrastructure and supply chains
may expose the U.S. government, citizens, and companies to Chinese
government intelligence collection and hacking. In the 2019 National Defense
Authorization Act, Congress prohibited executive agencies from procuring
140 JACKSON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 136, at Summary; cf. Jon D. Michaels, The
(Willingly) Fettered Executive: Presidential Spinoﬀs in National Security Domains and Beyond, 97 VA. L.
REV. 801, 807 (2011) (stating that the President’s signiﬁcant power to block proposed foreign
investment deemed detrimental to national security is closely identiﬁed with the Dubai Ports deal).
141 JACKSON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 136, at 1, 7 (describing policymakers’ support
for greater scrutiny by CFIUS of a range of foreign investments and the 2018 FIRRMA amendments
to Exon-Florio).
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telecommunications equipment or services from companies associated with
or owned by the Chinese government.142 In May 2019, President Trump
extended these import limitations to the private sector through an EO
prohibiting U.S. actors from acquiring information and communications
technology or services from designated foreign providers.143 These eﬀorts
target companies such as Huawei, with the goals of excluding Huawei’s
products from the United States and adversely aﬀecting Huawei’s business.
In May 2020, President Trump signed a similar EO to secure the U.S. bulk
power system.144
In addition to import limitations, the Executive Order also discouraged
U.S. pension funds from investing in Chinese companies. The U.S. Thrift
Savings Plan Board, which oversees the pension funds of U.S. government
employees, had planned to increase its exposure to Chinese companies to
diversify its investments and improve its rates of return.145 Members of
Congress and the White House criticized the Board’s proposal; a letter from
the National Economic Council Director and the National Security Advisor
to the Board expressed “grave concerns with the planned investment on
grounds of both investment risk and national security.”146 In response, the
Board abandoned those investments.
In 2020, the Trump Administration deployed another investment-related
tool to address a perceived threat to U.S. national security posed by Chinese
military companies. The President issued an EO ﬁnding that China was
“exploiting United States capital to resource and to enable the development
and modernization of its military, intelligence, and other security
apparatuses, which continues to allow the PRC to directly threaten the
United States homeland and United States forces overseas.”147 The President
prohibited transactions by U.S. persons of publicly traded securities or
142 John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115232, § 889, 132 Stat. 1636 (codiﬁed in scattered titles and sections of U.S.C.).
143 Exec. Order No. 13,873, 84 Fed. Reg. 22,689.
144 Exec. Order No. 13,920, 85 Fed. Reg. 26595 (“I further find that the unrestricted
acquisition or use in the United States of bulk-power system electric equipment designed,
developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the
jurisdiction or direction of foreign adversaries augments the ability of foreign adversaries to create
and exploit vulnerabilities . . . .”).
145 Ana Swanson, Federal Retirement Fund Halts Planned China Investment Under Pressure, N.Y.
TIMES (May 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/13/business/economy/china-tsp-federalretirement-fund.html [https://perma.cc/YQ72-KXQT] (“[T]he plan’s eﬀort to diversify the
international stock portion of the $593.7 billion it has in assets under management has become a
ﬂash point in an increasingly contentious relationship between the United States and China.”).
146 Thomas Franck, White House Directs Federal Pension Fund to Halt Investments in Chinese
Stocks, CNBC (May 12, 2020, 3:47 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/12/white-house-directsfederal-pension-fund-to-halt-investments-in-chinese-stocks.html [ https://perma.cc/2BLW-X2NP].
147 Exec. Order No. 13,959, 85 Fed. Reg. 73,185.
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derivatives of Chinese military companies to address this concern. On June
3, 2021, President Biden expanded the scope of that Executive Order.148
*

*

*

These recent examples illustrate that the United States has left almost
no economic stone unturned when considering how to influence the foreign
policy of other states and protect U.S. national security. Each of the tools
discussed in this Part has different strengths and weaknesses, though all
involve some costs to the U.S. economy. Further, all rely—to some extent—
on U.S. companies to enforce U.S. laws and regulations, thereby burdening
those industries. Finally, no one tool is perfectly tailored to accomplish its
goal, and even today’s broad collection of tools contains gaps and
imperfections. But the steady increase in economic coercion over time
reveals that the main alternative to economic statecraft—military force—is
viewed as even worse. Thus, rather than abandon the toolkit of economic
statecraft, we think that it is appropriate to make it more effective—and that
tax can help.
II. TAX AND FOREIGN POLICY: PAST AND PRESENT
Envisioning the proper role of tax law in implementing foreign policy
requires understanding how taxes operate on the interests of foreign actors
and the costs of acting on those interests. We address these topics and then
provide a brief history of how income tax law has been used in service of
foreign policy. This history illustrates that the primary use of tax law has been
to encourage U.S. businesses to invest in strategically important countries.
There are a few other foreign policy uses of tax law, but they reflect a reactive
posture in which Congress has responded to particular and temporary episodes
rather than developing a comprehensive and forward-looking approach.
A. The Eﬀects of Taxes
The income tax is, far and away, the single most important tax for the
U.S. federal government. Individual and corporate income taxes make up
ﬁfty-seven percent of federal revenues.149 Moreover, an enormous variety of
activities create taxable income, so the income tax provides many points of
leverage over individual and corporate actors. By contrast, tariﬀs and excise
148 See Exec. Order No. 14,032, 86 Fed. Reg. 30,145 (expanding the scope of earlier investment
prohibitions against China).
149 Briefing Book, TAX POL’Y CTR., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/brieﬁng-book/what-aresources-revenue-federal-government [https://perma.cc/LWZ2-ZH8Z].
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taxes are imposed on much narrower bases: only certain speciﬁed goods and
services. If there is a robust role for tax law as a tool of economic statecraft,
the focus will have to be the income tax.
There are two channels through which an income tax—indeed, any tax—
aﬀects a person engaged in the taxed activity. First, to the extent that the
person continues to pursue that activity and cannot pass the tax’s burden to
someone else through higher prices, the person must bear the burden of the
tax and is made poorer. With less wealth, that person will be less able to
undertake any costly activity. We call this the “wealth eﬀect.” Second, by
reducing the after-tax beneﬁts from the activity, the tax encourages the
taxpayer to spend her resources and eﬀorts on alternative activities. We call
this the “price eﬀect.”150 Both eﬀects will generally be present, with the
relative magnitudes depending on the particular activity and context.
Speciﬁcally, the availability of close substitutes for the taxed activity will tend
to cause the price eﬀect to dominate.
A simple example will illustrate the dynamics of these eﬀects. Consider a
foreign investor holding a portfolio of securities that includes bonds issued
both by U.S. corporations and by foreign corporations. Suppose that the bond
issuers all represent similar credit risks and pay interest at an annual rate of
5% and that the interest on the foreign bonds is exempt from tax. What would
be the eﬀect of imposing a 30% tax on the interest paid to foreign persons by
U.S. corporations? In general, the investor will not simply accept a 3.5% aftertax return on bonds that she was previously willing to hold with a 5% rate of
return. The imposition of this tax will set in motion a series of events.
First, the U.S. corporate issuer of the debt may need to increase the
interest that it pays foreign bondholders, either because of a contractual
obligation or market pressure. It is common in bank credit agreements for
the loan indenture to include a tax “gross-up” provision that requires the
issuer to compensate bondholders for a change in tax law that reduces the
after-tax return to the holders. In this case, the entire burden of the tax
would be borne by the U.S. issuer, not the bondholders. The increased costs
of raising capital through bond issuances will encourage the U.S. issuer to
consider substitute forms of financing, such as equity investments. In the
absence of a gross-up provision, the tax may motivate foreign investors to
sell their U.S. bonds to holders who do not pay the tax, such as U.S. investors
or tax-exempt entities. But if those investors were not willing to hold the
bonds to begin with, the U.S. issuers will have to increase the interest
150 These two eﬀects are very similar to what are called the “income” and “substitution” eﬀects
in the economics literature for describing the eﬀects of a tax on consumption. The substitution eﬀect
diﬀers from the price eﬀect in that the substitution eﬀect is estimated by compensating the taxpayer
for the tax paid.
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payable on the bonds to attract investors. The net result will be some mixture
of increased borrowing costs for U.S. companies and lower after-tax returns
for foreign holders of U.S. bonds. And there will be a shift in investment
capital away from U.S. corporate debt to foreign assets, U.S. equities, and
other substitute investments.
This example illustrates two general consequences of income taxes: they
redirect resources away from the income-producing activity being taxed (the
price effect), and they extract resources from the persons who continue to
engage in that activity (the wealth effect). Moreover, because the burden of
a given tax may vary across taxpayers—because they are in different tax
brackets or residents of different countries, for example—there are
“clientele” effects, whereby taxpayers who are less burdened by the tax
displace those for whom the taxed activity has become too costly. It is
essential to keep these effects in mind when using the income tax to
influence private actors in pursuit of foreign policy goals. If the goal is to
impoverish taxpayers engaged in an activity, then one wants the wealth
effects to dominate. If the aim is to discourage taxpayers from engaging in
the activity, one wants the price effect to dominate.
It is worth ﬁrst noting how the wealth and the price eﬀects appear through
a traditional tax policy lens. One function of the income tax is to allocate the
costs of ﬁnancing the government equitably. The wealth eﬀects of taxes are
the necessary consequence of paying for government, and they are generally
evaluated according to some fairness criterion according to which taxpayers
who have a greater ability to bear the burden of government pay more in
taxes. The price eﬀect is the change in behavior induced by the tax. This
behavioral change is generally viewed as undesirable insofar as individuals’
pre-tax allocations of time and resources are eﬃcient. Tax policy thus
generally strives to have as small an eﬀect on these allocations as possible.151
By contrast, a “tax sanctions” lens inverts these intuitions. A tax sanction
is a tax rule speciﬁc to a country, individual, or corporate target that increases
the eﬀective tax rate on that target’s income, or on income earned by other
persons from transactions with that target, in the service of speciﬁed U.S.
foreign policy purposes. Rather than trying to minimize the price eﬀect, a
good tax sanction will maximize that eﬀect, generating a very large behavioral
response away from the behavior it intends to discourage. And rather than
trying to make the wealth eﬀects as small as possible—minimizing revenue
needs through, for example, more eﬃcient government—a tax sanction with
large wealth eﬀects may be desirable insofar as it weakens the capacity of its
target to achieve any of its goals.
151 This discussion ignores certain exceptions, such as cases of externalities, public goods, and
other market imperfections.
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In addition to its eﬀects on taxpayer wealth and behavior, income tax law
also compels the disclosure of information about taxpayers and their
economic aﬀairs. Form 1040 and the associated schedules require U.S.
individual taxpayers to disclose all sorts of information, including details
about their family, investments, charitable donations, and whether they
maintain health insurance. Certain persons with ownership or control rights
in foreign corporations must disclose the foreign corporation’s income, assets,
ownership, and business activities. Certain foreign investors are exempt from
a thirty percent tax on the interest they receive from U.S. debtors only if they
certify under penalty of perjury that they are a foreign person and provide
identifying information.152 In sum, the IRS receives an enormous amount of
information about the economic activities of people within the long reach of
U.S. tax jurisdiction. In most cases, that information is collected to ensure
the accurate application of the tax laws but, as we discuss in Section II.C,
sometimes the relationship between tax and information is reversed:
collecting information is the goal and taxation is used to compel its disclosure.
B. History
Tax law was used in service of foreign policy throughout the twentieth
century,153 primarily to steer U.S. trade and investment towards strategically
important countries.154 The foreign policy case for this approach relies on a
collection of arguments about how economic interdependencies between
states reduce the risk of conﬂict, and how trade and investment lead to
growth, democratization, and moderation, which may make foreign states
friendlier to U.S. interests.155
For example, in the early 1920s the U.S. tax code contained special tax
exemptions for businesses operating in U.S. possessions156 and tax beneﬁts
I.R.C. § 871(h)(2)(B)(ii).
See generally Michael J. Graetz, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: Taxing International Income:
Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261, 307 (2001)
(discussing examples).
154 Encouraging investment in foreign countries may advance the United States’ ﬁnancial
interests and spread U.S. political inﬂuence. See Robert Hellawell, United States Income Taxation and
Less Developed Countries: A Critical Appraisal, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1393 (1966). The earned income
exclusion was also originally justiﬁed as a way to increase the presence of Americans abroad to
facilitate trade. Jeﬀrey Evans, Note, 911: The Foreign Earned Income Exclusion—Policy and
Enforcement, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 891, 895 (1997).
155 See Alan L. Gornick, Tax Incentives and Our National Foreign Policy, TAX EXEC., Apr. 1955,
at 3, 20 (arguing that expanded foreign trade will contribute to peace and security and deter
aggression); Ruth Mason, Efficient Management of the Wealth of Nations, TAX NOTES, Sept. 29,
2008, at 1321, 1321 (stating that economic interdependence provides a powerful market disincentive
for manipulation).
156 See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 262, 42 Stat. 227, 271 (detailing how to determine
income from sources within United States possessions).
152
153
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for investing in China.157 During the Cold War, several rules favored
investment in less-developed countries (LDCs), particularly in Latin
America. Income earned by controlled foreign corporations was treated more
favorably if the income was derived from an LDC and reinvested in an
LDC.158 The purpose of § 931—which currently excludes income from Guam,
American Samoa, and the Northern Mariana Islands—was to stimulate
economic development abroad, primarily in Puerto Rico and the Philippines
after they came under U.S. control following the Spanish-American War.159
And the foreign tax credit rules were also more favorable for income earned
in these jurisdictions.160
The cost to the United States of these tax incentives was foregone revenue
and redirection of private investment. During the economic boom of the
1960s, the tradeoﬀ between tax revenue and economic growth on the one hand
and foreign policy goals on the other hand favored foreign policy.161 But these
tax incentives were repealed when oil prices rose, the stock market crashed,
and the country sunk into a recession in the mid-1970s.162 The tradeoﬀ
between economic and foreign policy goals is contingent on economic
conditions and geopolitical circumstances, which vary over time.
The historical use of domestic income tax law to induce taxpayers to invest
in strategically important countries has shaped scholars’ imaginations about
what is possible. For example, Professor Graetz suggests that the foreign tax
credit or transfer pricing rules could be used to increase U.S. investment in
select countries.163 Professor Brown argues that the United States should
exempt income from sub-Saharan African countries for reasons having to do
with both equity and foreign policy.164 Daniel Lubetzky argues that the
157 China Trade Act of 1922, § 26, 42 Stat. 849, 856 (describing special dividends to Chinese
citizens for corporations organized under the China Trade Act).
158 26 U.S.C. § 954(b)(1) (repealed 1975).
159 See S. REP. NO. 99-313, at 477-78 (1985).
160 Donald R. Whittaker, An Examination of the O.E.C.D. and U.N. Model Tax Treaties: History,
Provisions and Application to U.S. Foreign Policy, 8 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REGUL. 39, 56 (1982)
(describing provisions designed to encourage investment in less developed countries, including
favorable foreign tax credits).
161 John M. Kline, A New Federalism for United States Foreign Policy, 41 INT’L J. 507, 511 (1986).
162 Id.
163 See Graetz, supra note 153, at 309. Another oft-discussed benefit is a tax credit for foreign
taxes even if those taxes are not paid—what are known as “tax sparing” provisions. The scholarly
appraisal of tax sparing rules is mixed. See, e.g., Kim Brooks, Tax Sparing: A Needed Incentive for
Foreign Investment in Low-Income Countries or an Unnecessary Revenue Sacrifice?, 34 QUEEN’S L.J.
505, 508 (2009) (reviewing tax sparing agreements adopted by other countries and arguing against
their usefulness).
164 Karen B. Brown, Missing Africa: Should U.S. International Tax Rules Accommodate Investment
in Developing Countries?, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 45, 48 (2002). For a more recent discussion of
this approach, see Yariv Brauner, The Future of Tax Incentives for Developing Countries, in TAX, LAW
AND DEVELOPMENT 25 (Yariv Brauner & Miranda Stewart eds., 2013).
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United States should provide incentives such as tax credits for investment in
joint ventures between Arabs and Israelis to increase regional stability and
facilitate long-term peace.165
Income tax treaties have been another critical tax mechanism for
encouraging foreign investment.166 Historically, the primary purpose of
income tax treaties has been to coordinate income tax jurisdiction between
two states so that nationals engaged in cross-border transactions would not
be taxed by both. In this way, income tax treaties are another tool—like
investment treaties and regional free trade agreements—to further economic
integration. As part of its income tax treaties, the United States has generally
provided nationals of the other states reduced tax rates on outbound passive
income payments, such as interest and dividends.167 But because tax treaties
are negotiated instruments designed to advance the interests of both
signatories, they provide carrots, not sticks. If the United States wants to steer
economic activity away from certain states, it must do so using domestic tax
law by amending the Code or the Treasury Regulations, or by issuing
administrative guidance.
Although changes to the Code require congressional action, changes in
statutory interpretation by the IRS can also have dramatic eﬀects on foreign
policy. An interesting episode illustrating the role of the IRS involved the
growing importance of OPEC in the 1970s and the creditability of certain
foreign levies on oil extraction. In a provocative article, one scholar argued
that the IRS changed its position on the creditability of these levies to compel
U.S. oil companies to renegotiate their contracts with the OPEC states.168 By
165 Daniel Lubetzky, Incentives for Peace and Profits: Federal Legislation to Encourage U.S.
Enterprises to Invest in Arab–Israeli Joint Ventures, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 405, 406 (1994). Professor
Dean argues that countries should move beyond simple tax information exchanges and contemplates
certain countries (generally richer countries) paying others for tax information. Steven A. Dean,
The Incomplete Global Market for Tax Information, 49 B.C. L. REV. 605, 667 (2008). For other
proposals to use tax to achieve foreign policy goals, see Diane L. Fahey, Can Tax Policy Stop Human
Traﬃcking?, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 345 (2009), proposing that tax on interest payments to residents of
countries that are not working to stop human traﬃcking should be subject to a higher rate of tax,
and Joshua A. Feinzeig, Note, Promoting World Peace Through the Use of the “Good Book”: Implementing
Foreign Policy Through the Tax Code, 40 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 953 (2015), arguing that tax law should
discourage the purchase of conﬂict minerals from the Democratic Republic of Congo.
166 AM. L. INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED
STATES INCOME TAXATION II, at 1 (1992) (“The principal function of income tax treaties is to
facilitate international trade and investment by removing—or preventing the erection of—tax
barriers to the free international exchange of goods and services and the free international movement
of capital and persons.”).
167 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION ¶ 66.3 (2001).
168 Julie Hayward Biggs, Foreign Policy Implications of the Abolition of the Foreign Tax Credit for
Oil Companies, 4 J. CORP. L. 339, 352 (1979) (“[I]t is likely that the reasoning behind the recent
changes in tax policy reﬂect[s] political motivation.”).
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forcing companies to renegotiate the oil contracts, the IRS could unify the
companies against the host governments, reduce the ability of OPEC
members to collude, and reduce U.S. involvement in foreign oil operations.169
C. Current Rules
This Section describes how domestic income tax law currently
incorporates foreign policy through mandatory information reporting and by
imposing penalties on taxpayers and certain tax-exempt entities that earn
income from certain countries.
1. Information Reporting
We begin by considering two mandatory disclosure regimes in federal
income tax law. These regimes illustrate that tax law can compel the disclosure
of information relevant to foreign policy while also revealing the importance
of limiting reporting obligations only to those taxpayers who have substantial
jurisdictional contacts with the United States.
a. Section 999
Congress added § 999 to the Code in the 1976 Tax Reform Act in response
to the Arab League’s boycott of Israel.170 Section 999 generally requires any
person or member of a corporate group that has “operations in, or related to”
a country, or with its government, companies, or nationals, to report their
operations to the IRS if that country requires participation in, or cooperation
with, an unsanctioned boycott as a condition of doing business.171 The
taxpayer must also disclose if it or a member of its corporate group has either
agreed, or been asked, to participate in or cooperate with such a boycott.172
An actual agreement to participate in such a boycott triggers adverse tax
consequences, described in the next subsection.173 The willful failure to report
under § 999 by an oﬃcer or employee of a corporation may result in modest
ﬁnes and imprisonment for up to one year.174
The only boycott to which § 999 currently applies is the boycott of Israel.
Each quarter, the Treasury Department publishes in the Federal Register the
countries that presently require cooperation with an unsanctioned boycott as
Id. at 355.
For an excellent overview of these rules, see Richard L. Kaplan, Income Taxes and the Arab
Boycott, 32 TAX LAW. 313, 316 (1979).
171 I.R.C. § 999. Section 999 applies only to transactions in tangible goods and excludes
primary boycotts. Id. § 999(b)(4).
172 Id. § 999(a)(2).
173 Id. § 999(b)(1).
174 Id. § 999(f).
169
170
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a condition of doing business in the country.175 As of April 8, 2021, these
countries are Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and
Yemen.176 The United States has an interest in obtaining information about
boycotts of Israel because Israel is a close ally and because a requirement to
obtain information might create a chilling eﬀect on companies that are
considering doing business in boycotting countries.
By requiring annual disclosures of boycott requests, § 999 provides a
way for Treasury to monitor the ebb and flow of pro-boycott attitudes,
enforcement, and compliance in the target jurisdictions. In places where
boycott rules are vigorously enforced or anti-Israeli sentiments are at a
high-water mark, there should be an increase in the number of boycott
requests. Thus, § 999 provides another vantage point for assessing on-theground sentiments in target states, taking advantage of the potentially
broad information collection network of U.S. multinationals. The
information can serve as a helpful complement to qualitative information
gathering efforts by intelligence professionals and formal communications
from government officials.
FIGURE 1: Boycott Requests and Agreements under § 999

Figure 1 shows the number of requests to participate in foreign boycotts
reported under § 999 between 1995 and 2017 and the number of agreements
to participate in those boycotts. Both data series show a general downward
trend since 1995 before increasing brieﬂy in 2007 and then resuming the

Id. § 999(a)(3)
List of Countries Requiring Cooperation with an International Boycott, 86 Fed. Reg. 18,374
(Apr. 8, 2021).
175
176
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downward trend.177 The increase in requests and agreements in 2007 came
from all listed countries, although for Yemen the increase ﬁrst began in 2006
and in Libya the increase in requests and agreements persisted through 2010.
b. FATCA
The most important recent example of the use of tax law to compel
information reporting is in §§ 1471–74 of the Code, which were added in 2010
by the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA).178 The FATCA rules
generally subject foreign ﬁnancial institutions and other foreign entities to a
thirty percent tax on certain U.S. source payments of investment income—
including interest and dividends—if those entities do not disclose
information to the IRS about their U.S. account holders and their accounts.179
The FATCA regime was not implemented for foreign policy purposes but
was a response to concerns about widespread tax evasion by U.S. persons
hiding income from assets held in overseas accounts.180 FATCA has been
widely criticized as “unilateral and extraterritorial legislation,”181 with
commentators arguing that it “strong arm[s] every ﬁnancial institution in the
world into doing the job of the IRS”182 and can require foreign banks to make
disclosures that conﬂict with local bank secrecy laws.183 And yet, as Professors
177 Before 2007, the tabulations were based on the returns with a tax accounting period ending
within the calendar year. Beginning in 2007, the tabulations include returns with accounting periods
ending between July of the study year and June of the following year. We do not think that this
change in accounting convention is likely to have caused the increase in reporting that we observe
in 2007. For the sources of Figure 1 statistics, see SOI Tax Stats – International Boycotts Table 1, IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-international-boycotts-table-1 [https://perma.cc/BTG3A5HM]. For an early analysis of Treasury data on the anti-boycott rules, see Richard L. Kaplan, A
Critical Examination of the Treasury Department’s Report on the Arab Boycott, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 23.
178 Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, § 501, 124 Stat. 97
(2010) (codiﬁed as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
179 I.R.C. § 1471.
180 J. Richard (Dick) Harvey, Jr., Oﬀshore Accounts: Insider’s Summary of FATCA and Its Potential
Future, 57 VILL. L. REV. 471, 487 (2012) (explaining that the goal of FATCA “was to reduce the
number of U.S. taxpayers using oﬀshore accounts to hide income from the IRS”). FATCA had other
consequences, too. See Lisa De Simone, Rebecca Lester & Kevin Markle, Transparency and Tax
Evasion: Evidence from the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), 58 J. ACCT. RSCH. 105, 147
(2020) (ﬁnding evidence of increased expatriations of U.S. citizens and increased investment in
assets not subject to FATCA reporting). The U.S. government has also participated in international
tax projects such as the OECD’s base erosion and proﬁt shifting project. See Ruth Mason, The
Transformation of International Tax, 114 AM. J. INT’L L. 353, 354 (2020) (discussing the signiﬁcance of
base erosion and proﬁt shifting project for international tax law).
181 Joshua D. Blank & Ruth Mason, Exporting FATCA, 142 TAX NOTES 1245, 1245 (2014).
182 Andrew F. Quinlan, FATCA and US Fiscal Imperialism Threaten to Sink Global Economy,
DAILY CALLER (Mar. 19, 2013, 1:30 AM), https://dailycaller.com/2013/03/19/fatca-and-us-ﬁscalimperialism-threaten-to-sink-global-economy [https://perma.cc/6AGW-P4PS].
183 Joel Slawotsky, US Financial Hegemony: The Digital Yuan and Risks of Dollar DeWeaponization, 44 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 39, 70-71 (2020). In response, the United States has entered
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Mason and Blank have noted, FATCA provoked copycat legislation in foreign
jurisdictions and laid the groundwork for multilateral automatic information
exchanges that beneﬁt tax compliance globally.184 In the ﬁnal analysis, it may
be that what was initially viewed as egregious jurisdictional overreach by
Congress will be viewed favorably by the international community. Professor
Stephan has demonstrated how examples of apparent U.S. overreach—
speciﬁcally anticartel law and the FCPA—ultimately resulted in international
norms that other states adopted or with which they cooperated.185
Nevertheless, the backlash to FATCA provides a cautionary tale about the
use of tax penalties to coerce information disclosures by foreign institutions
whose only nexus with the United States is the receipt of passive investment
income. It may be diﬃcult to draw a bright conceptual line between a foreign
direct investment in the United States—such as the establishment of a branch
or acquisition of a subsidiary—and a passive investment in U.S. securities.
But the decision to operate an active business in the United States generally
is preceded by greater research and due diligence into the legal and regulatory
obligations of operating in the United States than simply making a passive
investment. For this reason, we think that it is more reasonable to impose
greater regulatory burdens—including compliance with U.S. foreign policy
regulations—on foreigners operating an active business in the United States
than on foreigners merely earning passive income.
2. Tax Sanctions
In this subsection we summarize the few ways that the income tax
currently discourages U.S. persons from engaging in economic activity
adverse to U.S. foreign policy goals.186 We consider ﬁrst the rules that apply
to taxable U.S. persons and then discuss the treatment of tax-exempt entities.
into a number of intergovernmental agreements to resolve these conﬂicts. Robert Stack, Myth vs.
FATCA: The Truth About Treasury’s Eﬀort to Combat Oﬀshore Tax Evasion, U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY (Sept. 20, 2013) https://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/Myth-vs-FATCA.aspx
[https://perma.cc/L3DF-4JFH] (describing intergovernmental agreements allowing for foreign
bank information to be transmitted to the IRS only to the extent consented to or legally permitted
under local laws).
184 Blank & Mason, supra note 181, at 1245, 1247.
185 Paul B. Stephan, Antibribery Law (U. of Va. Sch. of L. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Rsch. Paper
Series, Paper No. 2021-30), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3870866 [https://
perma.cc/HZ5F-74PW]. See also VERDIER, supra note 66, at 3, 7-8, 32 (discussing a similar
phenomenon in the banking regulation context).
186 In addition to those we focus on here, the § 162 deduction of business expenses is disallowed
for any payment made to a government or its oﬃcials if the payment would be illegal under federal
law—including sanctions law. See I.R.C. § 162(c)(2) (prohibiting deductions for any “illegal payment
under any law of the United States”). The earned income exclusion generally available to U.S.
taxpayers whose tax homes are outside the United States is unavailable with respect to foreign
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a. Taxable Persons
There are two adverse tax consequences for a taxpayer who cooperates
with a foreign country’s unsanctioned boycott (a “§ 999 reportable
country”)187 or who earns income from a state that the United States does not
recognize, with which it does not conduct diplomatic relations, or that
supports terrorism (collectively, “§ 901(j) countries”).188
First, foreign tax credits that would otherwise be available for income
taxes paid to those countries are denied.189 The net eﬀect of denying foreign
tax credits is to increase the eﬀective tax rate on income from those sources,
generating wealth eﬀects and price eﬀects.190 To the extent that the price
eﬀect drives U.S. taxpayers from doing business in these states, it will deprive
the foreign state of access to U.S. capital investment and deprive U.S.
businesses of proﬁtable business opportunities. And there is a second way
that denying the foreign tax credit may advance U.S. foreign policy goals. To
the extent that foreign taxes are creditable against U.S. taxes, there is a real
sense in which the U.S. Treasury subsidizes the foreign regime. For each
dollar of a creditable foreign income tax, foreign tax revenues increase, and
U.S. tax revenues decrease. Subject to anti-abuse rules policing the foreign
tax credit, the foreign government can increase its tax rate up to the level of
the U.S. rate and redirect revenue from the U.S. Treasury to its own coﬀers.191
By eliminating the tax credit, the U.S. government prevents U.S. tax
revenues from ﬂowing to the foreign government.
Second, if a controlled foreign corporation (CFC) earns income in one of
these countries, then that income will be deemed to have been distributed to

countries for which travel is subject to regulations promulgated under IEEPA or the Trading With
the Enemy Act. § 911(d)(8)(B)(i).
187 See supra subsection II.C.1.a.
188 I.R.C. § 901(j).
189 Id. This may not matter for companies in an excess FTC position. See Paul R. McDaniel,
The U.S. Tax Treatment of Foreign Source Income Earned in Developing Countries: A Policy Analysis, 35
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 265 (2003). Some scholars argue that the tax credit should only be used
to relieve double taxation. See, e.g., Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, The
David R. Tillinghast Lecture, “What’s Source Got to Do With It?”: Source Rules and U.S. International
Taxation, 56 TAX L. REV. 81, 149 (2002) (“[T]he foreign tax credit and its associated rules for
determining the source of income and deductions for purposes of limiting that credit should be
aimed at providing double taxation relief . . . .”).
190 Foreign taxes that are not creditable because of the antiboycott rules are deductible. See
I.R.C. § 908(b); id. § 275(a)(4). But for the countries listed in § 901(j), non-creditable taxes are not
deductible. Although no longer the case, for a time, foreign taxes paid to South Africa were not
creditable, but they were deductible. Donald T. Williamson & Leo C. Moersen, Taxation as a Foreign
Policy Instrument: The Tax Collector as Diplomat?, 15 INT’L TAX J. 311, 313 (1989). For § 901(j) countries,
there are also separate § 904 and § 960 limitations.
191 If a foreign tax is contingent on the availability of a tax credit in the United States, no tax
credit is available. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(c) (2013); Treas. Reg. § 1.903-1(b) (1983).
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its shareholders and thus currently included in income by the CFC’s
signiﬁcant U.S. shareholders.192 Historically, the active business earnings of
CFCs—roughly, foreign corporations the majority of the stock of which is
held by U.S. persons with stakes of at least ten percent in the company193—
were not generally subject to U.S. tax until the company distributed those
earnings to its U.S. shareholders.194 This meant that the U.S. tax on these
earnings was deferred, often indeﬁnitely. Not all earnings of CFCs, however,
were entitled to deferral. So-called “subpart F income,”195 which includes
passive income such as interest and dividends, certain related party income,
and income attributable to a § 999 reportable country or a § 901(j) country,196
is generally taxed to the CFC’s U.S. shareholders before it is distributed.197
Figure 2: Tax Sanctions from § 999 Reportable Countries ($ thousands)

192 We do not discuss them because of their minor economic signiﬁcance, but there are
consequences of participating in a boycott for taxpayers with a “domestic international sales
corporation.” See I.R.C. § 995(b)(1)(F)(ii).
193 Id. §§ 951(b), 957(a).
194 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act: A Comparison for Large Businesses and International Taxpayers, IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-a-comparison-for-large-businesses-andinternational-taxpayers [https://perma.cc/L3YT-KJPG] (Aug. 27, 2021).
195 I.R.C. § 952(a).
196 Id. §§ 952(a)(3)(B), 952(a)(5).
197 LB&I INT’L PRAC. SERV. CONCEPT UNIT, IRS, SUBPART F OVERVIEW (2014),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/int_practice_units/DPLCUV_2_01.PDF [https://perma.cc/25SL-LG98].
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Figure 2 shows the amount of foreign tax credits disallowed and the
subpart F income included each year because of operations in § 999
reportable countries and § 901(j) countries. The two data series mostly track
each other over time, which is to be expected as subpart F income inclusions
generally bring with them the possibility of creditable foreign taxes paid on
that income. However, there is an interesting divergence beginning in 2007,
after which there is a rapid increase in subpart F income inclusions but a
decline in disallowed foreign tax credits.
Some observers have sharply criticized § 999.198 They argue that it does
not advance the core revenue-raising purpose of the income tax.199 They argue
that it does not deter companies who do not beneﬁt from the foreign tax
credit or that have no net taxable income.200 And they argue that the tax
departments of multinational corporations may not understand § 999 or be
capable of ensuring compliance.201 Nevertheless, there is evidence that § 999
has reduced the willingness of U.S. companies to participate in the Arab
League boycott and so it should not be dismissed out of hand.202
For a country to be removed from the list of § 901(j) countries, the
Secretary of State must make a certiﬁcation to the Secretary of the
Treasury.203 Thus, whether the tax sanctions associated with § 901(j) apply
depends on determinations made by the department in charge of foreign
relations, rather than the department in charge of tax and ﬁnancial policy.
The tax credit limits of § 901(j) can also be waived if the President
“determines that a waiver . . . is in the national interest of the United States
and will expand trade and investment opportunities for United States
companies in such country,”204 leaving some discretion in the hands of the
President while limiting the justiﬁcations for the exercise of that discretion
to ones based in trade and investment policy. We think that this strikes a
sensible balance, requiring reason giving from the President while providing
them with the ﬂexibility to waive the § 901(j) tax sanctions.

198 See, e.g., James P. Holden & William F. Brown, A Paradox: Why Does the Federal Tax Law
Penalize United States Taxpayers Who Observe the Boycott of South Africa by United States Allies?,
42 TAX LAW. 211, 232 (1989) (“[S]ection 999 is easily the least revenue-related measure ever made
part of the Code.”).
199 Id.
200 Id. at 231.
201 Id. at 232 (“The tax department, to the extent that it understands section 999 at all, usually
does not have supervisory authority over operating personnel or even the lines of communication
to assert the necessity of compliance.”).
202 James R. Hines, Jr., Taxed Avoidance: American Participation in Unsanctioned International
Boycotts (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 6116, 1997), https://www.nber.org/system/
ﬁles/working_papers/w6116/w6116.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3FS-R9QR].
203 I.R.C. § 901(j)(2)(B)(ii).
204 Id. § 901(j)(5)(A)(i).
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b. Tax-Exempt Entities
Section 501 of the Code exempts certain organizations from U.S. income
taxes.205 Best known among these organizations are those that are “organized
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientiﬁc, testing for public
safety, literary, or educational purposes”—called 501(c)(3) organizations for
the section of the Code in which they appear.206 Under § 501(p), an otherwise
eligible entity’s tax exempt status (or application for such status) is suspended
if it has certain connections to terrorism.207
Speciﬁcally, an organization’s tax exempt status is suspended if it is
identiﬁed as a foreign terrorist organization (i) under the Immigration and
Nationality Act, (ii) pursuant to a terrorism-related EO issued under IEEPA
or the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 for the purpose of sanctioning
the organization, or (iii) pursuant to an EO if the organization is identiﬁed
as supporting or engaging in terrorism.208 By using EOs or terrorist
designation under the Immigration and Nationality Act, § 501(p) delegates
the decision about which entities lose tax-exempt status to the foreign policy
judgment of the Executive.
Aﬀording tax-exempt status to certain organizations can work at cross
purposes with foreign policy in two ways. First, the exemption itself leaves
these organizations with more resources to pursue their mission, which may
conﬂict with U.S. security interests—i.e., the wealth eﬀect. Second, the
deductibility of contributions to such organizations increases the after-tax
wealth of donors who may be more likely to engage in other activities adverse
to U.S. national security interests, and it may increase the amount of
contributions to such organizations by reducing the after-tax price of the
contributions—i.e., the price eﬀect. To the extent it increases the amount of
such contributions, the economic eﬀect is equivalent to the Treasury making
a direct cash grant to such organizations.209
Id. § 501(a).
Id. § 501(c)(3).
Charitable contributions to such organizations are also nondeductible. Id. § 501(p)(4).
Section 501(p) might be thought of as a partial codiﬁcation of the “public policy doctrine,” which
denies tax exempt status to otherwise eligible organizations that engage in activities contrary to a
fundamental public policy. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). Professor
Mirkay argues that the public policy doctrine should be used in the foreign policy context. See
Nicholas A. Mirkay, Globalism, Public Policy, and Tax-Exempt Status: Are U.S. Charities Adrift at Sea?,
91 N.C. L. REV. 851, 859 (2013) (“[T]he public policy doctrine needs congressional attention . . .
[but] the automatic inclusion of U.S. foreign policy and international law as components of
‘established public policy’ would be impractical and onerous . . . .”).
208 I.R.C. § 501(p)(2).
209 Along these lines, David Pozen has argued that tax exemptions should be viewed as a form
of foreign aid, to the extent that they apply to nonproﬁts that support persons overseas. David E.
Pozen, Hidden Foreign Aid, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 641 (2007).
205
206
207
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c. Unintended Eﬀects of TCJA
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017 made dramatic changes to how
the United States taxes international income. Before TCJA, U.S.
shareholders of CFCs enjoyed deferral of U.S. taxes on active earnings of
those CFCs.210 It was against this backdrop that denying deferral for § 999
reportable countries and § 901(j) countries operated as a tax sanction.
TCJA reduced both the availability and beneﬁt of tax deferral for income
earned by CFCs. First, the TCJA lowered the top U.S. corporate tax rate
from thirty-ﬁve percent to twenty-one percent.211 The beneﬁts of deferral—
and therefore the penalty imposed by denying deferral—diminish as the U.S.
corporate rate falls.212 By cutting the corporate tax rate, TCJA reduced the
eﬃcacy of tax sanctions. Second, it is no longer only subpart F income of
CFCs that is subject to current U.S. taxation, but roughly all earnings of
CFCs above a deemed rate of return on the tangible assets of the CFCs.213
This so-called “GILTI” income is taxed at favorable rates,214 so whether this
new regime results in higher or lower eﬀective U.S. tax rates on CFC
earnings that would have otherwise been deferred depends on when those
earnings would have been repatriated. However, given the lengthy deferrals
that motivated the GILTI rules to begin with and the opportunity for
multinationals to take advantage of periodic repatriation holidays that reduce
the eﬀective tax rate on foreign earnings, it is likely that the GILTI rules will
increase the eﬀective U.S. tax rate on foreign earnings. By eliminating
deferral, the new GILTI rules also reduce the punitive eﬀects of tax sanctions
for income from § 999 reportable and § 901(j) countries, because the income
will be taxed currently in any event.
TCJA also doubled the standard deduction and limited certain other
itemized deductions. As a result, the share of taxpayers who itemize their
deductions fell from 46 million in 2017 to 19 million in 2018.215 Because only
individuals who itemize their deductions benefit from the charitable
contribution deduction, these reforms mean that the rules in § 501(p)

See supra text accompanying note 194.
See How Did the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act Change Business Taxes?, TAX POL’Y CTR.,
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/brieﬁng-book/how-did-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-change-businesstaxes [https://perma.cc/6GVC-MYU2].
212 The value of deferring for y years the inclusion of $X of income taxed at rate t is attributable
to the time value of money. If the relevant interest rate is i, then the value of deferral is
tX (1 – [1 ÷ (1 + i)y]). Clearly, if the tax rate t falls then this value also falls.
213 We refer to the taxation of Global Intangible Low Taxed Income. See I.R.C. § 951A(b).
214 Id. § 250(a)(1) (generally providing a deduction for ﬁfty percent of GILTI income).
215 Howard Gleckman, A Last Look At the 2019 Filing Season, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Apr. 25, 2019),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/last-look-2019-filing-season [https://perma.cc/2LM8-KTZZ].
210
211
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denying a deduction for charitable contributions to listed organizations also
become less punitive.
Collectively, TCJA undermined the already modest tax penalties that
work in service of U.S. foreign policy. We do not think that this was by
design. Although the economic consequences of the TCJA reforms are more
important than their unintended eﬀects on foreign policy, it does not appear
that Congress even considered these foreign policy eﬀects. Perhaps this
illustrates a peril of implementing foreign policy through tax law: the
interconnectedness of tax provisions makes it easy for a Congress concerned
with revenue, economic growth, or inequality to make changes that
inadvertently undermine tax as a tool of foreign policy. This does not have to
be the case, though. The solution is to decouple foreign policy–related
provisions from other tax rules, or for foreign policy to play a greater role in
tax law, so that those undertaking tax reform are less likely to overlook those
provisions. The next Part expands on this idea, arguing that there is more
room for foreign policy in tax law than conventional wisdom suggests and
that many of the hurdles to pursuing this approach can be overcome.
III. THE CASE FOR TAX SANCTIONS
We begin this part by describing three ways that tax sanctions can serve
U.S. foreign policy goals. We then make our case for tax sanctions as a tool
of foreign policy, both in general and in the present moment.
A. Outbound and Inbound Sanctions
For a given foreign target, our deﬁnition of tax sanctions covers two
categories of rules: tax sanctions imposed on U.S. persons who transact with
the foreign target (“outbound tax sanctions”), and tax sanctions imposed on
foreign persons—including the foreign target—for income connected to the
United States (“inbound tax sanctions”).
In the case of an outbound tax sanction, the punitive tax rule applies to
U.S. persons, even though the purpose of the sanction is to change the
behavior of a foreign target. For example, the loss of foreign tax credits and
deferral of income of U.S. shareholders earned by CFCs in § 901(j) countries
is an outbound tax sanction. The burden placed by the tax sanction on the
U.S. shareholder is an indirect way of burdening the target country. The U.S.
shareholder is merely a surrogate target of the tax sanction; the § 901(j)
country is the real target. Fundamentally, outbound tax sanctions rely on the
sensitivity of U.S. taxpayers to changes in the cost of earning income in the
target state.

2022]

Tax Law as Foreign Policy

317

Outbound tax sanctions are especially helpful as part of a longer-term
strategy exploiting the price eﬀect when the goal is to redirect U.S.
investment from the target state or foreign industry. The loss of U.S.
portfolio investment will drive up the cost of raising capital for businesses in
the target state, and the loss of U.S. direct investment reduces income and
employment in the target state and—perhaps more importantly—the
knowledge and technology transfers that generally accompany foreign direct
investment.216 Outbound tax sanctions are most eﬀective when the price
eﬀect is large. That is, they work best when the burden on the surrogate target
is light because the economic advantages of doing business in the target state
are modest compared to the next-best alternative, and the burden to the target
state of losing the business of the surrogate is large.
A natural way to increase the scope of outbound tax sanctions would be
to add to the countries listed in § 901(j). Countries could be added by
Congress itself or by delegating the choice of target countries to the
Executive. Outbound tax sanctions could also be extended by considering
mechanisms other than the foreign tax credit and the subpart F rules. For
example, Congress could subject the income of CFCs in target jurisdictions
to a minimum tax.217 As discussed above, the changes made under TCJA
weakened the § 901(j) regime, so changes like these may be necessary even if
the list of 901(j) countries remains unchanged.
Another possibility is to discourage lending by U.S. taxpayers to target
states. Professors Jayachandran and Kremer have argued that prohibiting new
lending to dictators, or limiting the ability of creditors to look to the assets
of successor regimes to satisfy their debts, would reduce the amount of
lending to those dictatorships.218 Such restrictions would have the beneﬁt of
targeting the dictator rather than the foreign population more generally, and
prevent subsequent regimes from being burdened by debt incurred by the
prior regime. Tax sanctions provide an alternative here, too. The interest
income from loans extended to target states or non-state actors could be taxed
at a higher rate than other interest, or foreign taxes on that income could be
non-creditable, which would reduce the supply to targets of credit by banks
and other lenders subject to U.S. tax jurisdiction. And the long reach of that
216 See, e.g., Carol Newman, John Rand, Theodore Talbot & Finn Tarp, Technology Transfers,
Foreign Investment and Productivity Spillovers, 76 EUR. ECON. REV. 168 (2015) (ﬁnding substantial
technology transfers accompanying foreign direct investment in Vietnam).
217 At the time of writing, the United States has endorsed a global minimum tax of ﬁfteen
percent on the income of certain multinational corporations. See Ruth Mason, The Fine Print on the
Global Tax Deal, FOREIGN AFFS. (Nov. 8, 2021), https://www.foreignaﬀairs.com/articles/unitedstates/2021-11-08/ﬁne-print-global-tax-deal [https://perma.cc/FZM8-WFHQ]. A current minimum
tax of ﬁfteen percent on corporate earnings would reduce the ability of the United States to impose
tax sanctions for the same reasons as the GILTI rules discussed above.
218 Seema Jayachandran & Michael Kremer, Odious Debt, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 82 (2006).
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jurisdiction could allow outbound tax sanctions to operate on a large number
of surrogate targets, which might reduce the need to enforce secondary
sanctions—sanctions on foreign companies that do business with sanctioned
companies—which have proven controversial with U.S. allies. Outbound tax
sanctions might oﬀer another advantage over traditional ﬁnancial sanctions:
because tax sanctions are not outright prohibitions but merely costs of doing
business, they may generate less backlash.
Inbound tax sanctions apply to foreign persons who have a U.S. business
or who receive payments of U.S. investment income. Inbound sanctions
exploit the wealth eﬀect to impose economic hardship on the target and so
they work best when the price eﬀect is small—that is, when it is very costly
for the foreign target to substitute alternatives to the income subject to the
tax. Fundamentally, inbound tax sanctions rely on the sensitivity of foreign
taxpayers to changes in the cost of earning income in the United States.
An example of an inbound tax sanction would be an additional
withholding tax on payments of interest, dividends, and royalties made to
foreigners by banks and other “withholding agents.”219 Inbound tax sanctions
are likely to be more salient to foreigners than outbound tax sanctions. The
foreign targets of inbound tax sanctions pay the tax themselves: consider the
foreign investor subject to a higher rate of withholding tax. By contrast, the
real foreign target of outbound sanctions only suﬀers the economic eﬀects of
decisions made by surrogates who are inﬂuenced by the taxes: consider the
U.S. corporation that does not invest in a target country because of the tax
sanction.220 The heightened salience of inbound tax sanctions may be a
virtue—if it makes the foreign target more likely to change its behavior—or
a vice—if it increases the likelihood of retaliation by the foreign target. And
if the inbound tax sanctions are imposed on foreign surrogate targets, such as
foreign corporations doing business in a target state, then the backlash could
be widespread among allies as well as adversaries. The response to FATCA
provides a cautionary tale about what the United States can demand from
foreign persons under the threat of greater withholding taxes.221 For this
reason, inbound tax sanctions may be more palatable to U.S. allies when they
are premised on the foreign actor having an active business in the United
States through a branch or subsidiary rather than merely earning passive
income from U.S. sources.

I.R.C. § 1441.
How a tax is paid aﬀects the perception of its burden. For a discussion of evidence of this
in the property tax context, see Andrew T. Hayashi, The Legal Salience of Taxation, 81 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1443 (2014).
221 See supra Section II.C.
219
220
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Although the purpose of sanctions is generally to compel the target to
change its behavior, the reliance on surrogates for imposing tax sanctions
allows tax sanctions to serve another function: encouraging taxpayers to
collect and report valuable information to policymakers or national security
experts. For example, the anti-boycott reporting done under § 999 provides
the United States with a measure of the vitality of the Arab League boycott
in any given year. As anti-Israeli sentiment waxes and wanes over time, so
should the vigor with which businesses and individuals in § 999 countries
demand compliance with national boycott laws. Additional reporting
requirements, such as those that could shed light on the structure of terrorist
ﬁnancing, could also be enforced with tax sanctions.
Encouraging U.S. companies to operate in target states and report
information with their tax return may be more helpful than encouraging the
companies to divest from the country through an outbound tax sanction. For
example, global technology companies could be required to report when
foreign government clients force them to share their source codes, build in
backdoors to spy on their citizens, or censor internet searches. This is
information the U.S. government might be able to get through other avenues,
but only piecemeal and after signiﬁcant eﬀort. Enlisting U.S. multinationals
to report through the tax code could signiﬁcantly add to the information
available to foreign policymakers.
B. The General Case for Tax Sanctions
We make three independent arguments for using tax sanctions to achieve
foreign policy goals. First, adding tax to the foreign policy toolkit will allow
U.S. economic inﬂuence to reach more foreign targets and will involve more,
and a greater variety of, actors in implementing rules that advance U.S.
foreign policy goals. Second, using tax sanctions is beneﬁcial even if they do
not extend the reach of economic sanctions, because they operate on diﬀerent
points of leverage than existing sanctions. Because the costs of using any one
tool can increase rapidly with its use, the costs of economic coercion are
minimized when more tools are used.222 Adding tax to the toolkit of economic
statecraft allows policymakers to use other tools less aggressively. Third, tax
222 One concern with increasing the number of tools is the possibility of inadequate
coordination among the various departments and agencies—such as the Commerce, Treasury, and
State Departments. Poor coordination could result in an aggregate of sanctions that operates
eﬀectively like an embargo or could make it diﬃcult to communicate to targets how to obtain
sanctions relief. And if Congress plays a role in imposing tax sanctions, then targets may wonder
whether the sanctions are motivated by foreign policy or domestic politics, in which case they may
be less inclined to think that changing their behavior will obtain relief. The National Security
Council’s role in coordinating these approaches and clearly communicating the conditions necessary
for relief becomes more important as tools proliferate.
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law may oﬀer greater ﬂexibility than other kinds of sanctions and may be a
less salient instrument of coercion to U.S. adversaries.223
1. More Targets, More Enforcers
The federal income tax reaches all U.S. citizens, regardless of their place
of birth or residence,224 and all individuals who are U.S. residents by virtue
of having lawful permanent resident status or by being physically present in
the United States for a suﬃcient number of days in a year.225 The income tax
applies to all corporations organized in the United States, regardless of where
their business operations or customers are located.226 And the income tax
reaches foreign individuals and corporations too, if they either have a trade
or business in the United States or have U.S. source income.227 The reach of
the income tax is broad indeed.
Foreigners who have a business in the United States not only may have
U.S. tax liability for the income from that business, but they also must ﬁle a
U.S. tax return.228 Thus, coming within U.S. tax jurisdiction not only
provides the United States with an opportunity to impose tax, but it also
provides the basis for compelling information disclosures that are relevant to
that U.S. liability. A foreign person who receives passive U.S. investment
income does not generally need to ﬁle a tax return,229 but even in that case
they still generally must disclose certain information to the payors of that
income. For example, some foreign individuals who are the beneﬁcial owners
of U.S. corporate bonds must provide identifying information to be exempt
from a thirty percent withholding tax that would otherwise apply.230 And, as
223 Some scholars argue that the use of tax law for foreign policy is “at best an awkward and
indirect device,” in part because it is less salient to taxpayers. Williamson & Moersen, supra note
190, at 317. We think that this lack of salience may be an advantage.
224 See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(30)(A) (stating that for tax purposes, the term “United States person”
includes both citizens and residents). The United States is the only country to tax its citizens
wherever they reside. This is controversial. Compare Ruth Mason, Citizenship Taxation, 89 S. CAL.
L. REV. 169, 238 (2016) (arguing that citizenship-based taxation is “inadministrable, ineﬃcient, and
often unfair”), with Michael S. Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443
(2007) (arguing that there is a strong justiﬁcation for taxing based on U.S. citizenship). In practice,
of course, only citizens with taxable income are subject to tax.
225 I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A) (resident aliens include lawful permanent residents and those
meeting the “substantial presence test”).
226 Id. § 7701(a)(4).
227 Id. §§ 872(a), 881, 882.
228 Foreign corporations with a U.S. trade or business must ﬁle form 1120-F. 26 C.F.R.
§ 1.6012-2(g)(1)(i) (2021).
229 I.R.C. § 6012(a)(8) (nonresident aliens subject only to withholding taxes generally not
required to ﬁle a return).
230 Id. § 871(h)(2) (stating that exemption from withholding for portfolio interest requires a
statement that “the beneﬁcial owner of the obligation is not a United States person”).
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discussed above, payors of U.S. source income to foreign persons have an
obligation to withhold any taxes owed on the amounts paid.231 This creates a
strong incentive for the U.S. payor to collect the information required by law
to exempt the payment from withholding.
Adding tax to the economic coercion toolkit increases the number of
foreign targets that can be subject to U.S. inﬂuence and ﬁlls gaps in the
coverage of existing tools. Export controls and tariﬀs operate only through
cross-border trade in goods. Financial sanctions generally only aﬀect those
with U.S. situs assets. By contrast, U.S. taxation reaches anyone who operates
a trade or business in the United States, regardless of whether that business
owns real or personal property located in the United States. For example, a
foreign company may have a taxable business in the United States if it is
represented by an agent in the United States whose activities are imputed to
the foreign company. U.S. tax jurisdiction also reaches anyone who earns
passive investment income such as interest, dividends, rents, or royalties from
U.S. sources.
Moreover, whereas the enforcement of financial sanctions primarily falls
to banks and other financial intermediaries, federal income tax law reaches
all economic activity that generates revenue with a U.S. nexus. Tax law
therefore fills gaps in the coverage of economic statecraft by reaching
industries and sites of nexus that are not already included. Because
information reporting and tax withholding obligations can apply to anyone
who makes a reportable payment, the number of parties involved in
enforcing a tax rule aimed at foreign targets is also much greater. This
spreads the cost of enforcing tax sanctions across many businesses and
industries and shifts some of the burden to foreign entities. By contrast, the
burden of enforcing travel restrictions or asset freezes generally falls on
airlines and financial institutions, and defense and technology companies
shoulder much of the burden for enforcing export controls.
Inbound sanctions leverage the attractiveness of U.S. markets to foreign
actors to extract costly concessions from those actors in service of U.S.
foreign policy. If the costs of acceding to U.S. demands exceed the benefits
of U.S. market access, then targets and surrogates will not incur them. The
imposition of a tax on U.S. source income is one such cost, but so are any
information disclosures that foreign investors must make to the IRS. It is
the sum of the two costs that matters to foreigners in deciding whether to
become subject to U.S. tax jurisdiction. Seeing this makes clear both the
promise and limits of tax law for influencing foreign actors. Consider a
foreign manufacturer weighing whether to establish a branch in the United
States. As access to U.S. markets becomes more profitable for the
231

Id. §§ 1441, 1442.
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manufacturer, more concessions can be extracted for the privilege of
access.232 Because increasing the tax rate on U.S. source income reduces the
value of access to U.S. markets, it reduces the other demands that can be
made on foreign actors. Conversely, reducing the tax rate creates more room
to make other costly demands on foreigners, such as information disclosures
or compliance with some costly regulation. We can compare the potential of
tax in this context with the existing rules under export controls. Export
controls merely prohibit or permit certain transfers to foreigners. A tax
sanction could be used to extract information disclosures or other
concessions from potential foreign investors that may be worth the added
risk of undesirable technology transfers.
How can tax sanctions coerce foreign investors to change their behavior
or comply with some regulatory obligation? The actor will comply only if two
things are true: (1) the cost of compliance is less than the additional tax she
will pay if she continues to earn income in the United States and does not
comply with the regulatory obligation, and (2) the after-tax beneﬁts of
complying are less than the after-tax beneﬁts of divesting from the United
States. There are therefore two constraints on what the United States can
demand by using its tax leverage. By setting the tax sanction as high as
possible, the government can ensure that the taxpayer will always prefer
complying to paying the tax sanction. Reducing the normal (i.e., nonsanction) level of tax increases the beneﬁts from investing in the United
States and increases the demands that can be made on the target.
2. Same Targets, Diﬀerent Interests
The continued emergence of China as an economic power, the rise of
alternatives to the dollar as a reserve currency,233 and the development of
novel ﬁnancial technologies such as decentralized ﬁnance, which may
eventually displace the U.S. ﬁnancial system as a clearing mechanism for
international transactions, all raise the risk that overuse of existing sanctions
will lead to foreign actors decoupling their ﬁnancial aﬀairs from U.S. banks
and the U.S. dollar as a reserve.
As a result, even if everyone subject to U.S. tax jurisdiction is already
required to comply with existing sanctions regimes, there would be
232 A related issue is how easily sanctions can be evaded, something aﬀected by whether
sanctions are imposed unilaterally or multilaterally. Most early work found that unilateral sanctions
were more eﬀective, but recent evidence ﬁnds the opposite. See Navin A. Bapat & T. Clifton
Morgan, Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered: A Test Using New Data, 53 INT’L STUD.
Q. 1075 (2009).
233 Gabriele Galati & Philip Wooldridge, The Euro As a Reserve Currency: A Challenge to the
Pre-eminence of the US Dollar?, 14 INT’L J. FIN. & ECON. 1 (2009) (“The US dollar has maintained
its place as the dominant reserve currency . . . .”).
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advantages to adding tax law to the economic statecraft toolkit. This is
because even if tax operates on the same actors as other tools, it operates on
diﬀerent interests of those actors. Targeted ﬁnancial sanctions aﬀect the
foreign target’s ability to use the U.S. ﬁnancial system; export controls aﬀect
the ability of the target to import sensitive goods; and tariﬀs aﬀect the ability
of the target to sell goods into the U.S. market. By contrast, tax law aﬀects
all economic activity that generates U.S.-source revenues. Increasing the
number of interests on which U.S. economic coercion operates increases the
number of points of leverage. Increasing the number of economic points of
leverage can reduce the strain on other levers of inﬂuence and compel costlier
compliance by the target.
For example, suppose that the foreign target uses both the U.S. banking
system and earns income subject to U.S. tax. Speciﬁcally, consider a foreign
manufacturing corporation with a U.S. branch that earns commissions from
sales made abroad in foreign currencies. If we add tax to the toolkit, then
noncompliance will cause the target to both lose access to the U.S. banking
system and subject the branch’s income to a tax sanction.234 The target will
now comply if the cost of compliance is less than the beneﬁt of accessing the
U.S. ﬁnancial system plus the cost of the tax sanction, and the beneﬁt of the
U.S. ﬁnancial system plus the pre-tax beneﬁt of continuing to earn income in
the United States.
Because income subject to U.S. tax is not limited to income denominated
in U.S. dollars, processed through U.S. ﬁnancial institutions, or earned from
a U.S. source, adding tax sanctions adds another cost to the loss of banking
access for noncompliance.235 It will generally be preferable to set this sanction
very high, so that the limit on what can be demanded of the foreign target is
limited by the total after-tax beneﬁts of the U.S. banking system and earning
income in the United States. For the sake of this example, however, assume
that the tax sanction is set low enough that the target is just indiﬀerent
between paying the tax sanction and losing access to U.S. banking. In that
case, introducing tax sanctions creates two options for U.S. policymakers.
The ﬁrst possibility is to allow the United States to extract more costly
compliance from the target with its foreign policy goals than it would be able
to if only ﬁnancial sanctions were available.
The second possibility is to divide compliance into two parts—say, two
regulations—so that compliance with the first regulation is necessary to

234 If a foreign target were denied access to the U.S. banking system and subject to a tax
sanction—or regular U.S. tax—it would need an exemption or license from OFAC allowing tax
payments to be processed through U.S. banks and collected by the Treasury.
235 All income, including foreign-source income that is eﬀectively connected to a U.S. trade
or business, is subject to U.S. income tax. See I.R.C. § 864(c)(4).
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access the financial system and compliance with the second regulation is
necessary to avoid the tax sanction. Dividing things up in this way will not
affect the total compliance that can be demanded from targets, but it reduces
the compliance costs that the target must incur to preserve access to the U.S.
financial system and so the target will be more willing to incur those costs.
For example, consider a foreign corporation with a U.S. subsidiary where
the corporate group has profitable operations in target states X and Y. The
first possibility contemplates both denying access to the U.S. financial
system and imposing a tax sanction on the U.S. subsidiary unless the
corporate group divests from those two target states. The second possibility
might be to condition access to the U.S. financial system on divesting from
country X and to impose a tax sanction on the subsidiary unless the group
divests from country Y.
The greater the after-tax beneﬁts of earning income in the United States,
the higher the tax sanction can be set. This greater ﬂexibility allows the
United States to either increase the total regulatory demands that can be
made on foreign targets or simply make the same costly demands but in a way
that is less reliant on other sanctions.
The risks of overusing economic tools are that they will either impose
intolerable costs on domestic actors or impose intolerable costs on foreign
actors so that they disentangle themselves from the U.S. economic or
ﬁnancial system rather than bear those costs.236 If they do, the tools will lose
their eﬀectiveness altogether. A cautionary example of this is the case of the
1980 grain embargo that the United States imposed on the Soviet Union.
Although the embargo increased the price of grain in the U.S.S.R., it failed
to deter the U.S.S.R. from its engagement in Afghanistan, cost the United
States $2.3 billion, and caused U.S. farmers to permanently lose their market
share in the U.S.S.R., which they never recovered because of Russian
concerns about becoming vulnerable again to such an embargo.237 The goal of
economic coercion is to make the targets do what the coercive state wants.
However, the emergence of cheap alternatives—to U.S. grain, or ﬁnancial
services, for example—threatens the viability of that coercion.
The activities that create a U.S. tax nexus remain attractive to the rest of
the world and therefore serve today as potentially powerful sources of
leverage. First, the United States is an enormous destination for foreign
goods and services. Second, U.S. persons are the owners of valuable
technology that is in demand by foreign actors. Third, the productivity of
236 See Joshua P. Zoﬀer, The Dollar and the United States’ Exorbitant Power to Sanction, 113 AJIL
UNBOUND 152, 156 (2019) (suggesting that a recent surge of dollar-based sanctions resulted in
opposition and risk of retaliation even among America’s European allies).
237 Davis & Engerman, supra note 19, at 194.
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American labor makes it an attractive destination for foreign capital. Fourth,
the U.S. legal and regulatory environment makes it a favored place to
incorporate or ﬁnance a business.238 Over a longer horizon, these are more
durable and less substitutable than the U.S. ﬁnancial system or dollar, and so
these economic, legal, and regulatory assets provide a strong foundation from
which to leverage the conduct of foreign actors.
3. Flexibility
Another advantage to using tax law is its built-in ﬂexibility to modulate
incentives. Tax sanctions can be adjusted by degrees, encouraging or
discouraging speciﬁc activities without prohibiting them entirely.239 Why is
modulation helpful? If the government’s goal is to maximize compliance then
it should set the tax sanction higher than the beneﬁt from investing in the
United States relative to a foreign country. Doing so allows the government
to extract all of the excess proﬁts from investing in the United States in the
form of costly compliance with U.S. foreign policy regulation.
But for the target, tax sanctions and compliance costs are substitutes.
Reducing the tax sanction will induce certain investors—the ones who get
the greatest benefit from investing in the United States, or for whom
compliance is the costliest—to pay the tax sanction rather than comply. The
revenue from the sanction in this case serves as a second-best outcome to
compliance with a foreign policy regulation. But sometimes the second best
outcome is preferable to setting the tax sanction high enough to effectively
ban investing in the United States, because a tax sanction that functions as a
ban may be more likely to become politically salient and lead to reciprocal
sanctions from target states.240 For these reasons, the government may prefer

238 For example, Delaware corporate law appears to increase ﬁrm value. Robert Daines, Does
Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FINANCIAL ECON. 525, 555 (2001). Increased focus on
corporate governance by securities exchanges has reduced the need to incorporate in the U.S. to get
regulatory beneﬁts. Eric L. Talley, Corporate Inversions and the Unbundling of Regulatory Competition,
101 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2015).
239 It is true that the Treasury Department can modulate sanctions by granting licenses for
transactions that would otherwise be prohibited, but these licenses do not always give suﬃcient
comfort to those who could operate under them. See, e.g., Aziz El Yaakoubi, Jonathan Landay &
Matt Spetalnick, U.S. to Designate Yemen’s Houthi Movement as Foreign Terrorist Group, REUTERS (Jan.
10, 2021, 6:26 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-usa/u-s-to-designate-yemenshouthi-movement-as-foreign-terrorist-group-idUSKBN29F0P5 [https://perma.cc/WMV9-ZNAR]
(“Relief officials have said licenses often fail to reassure banks and insurers they will not fall
afoul of sanctions.”).
240 For an example of reciprocated sanctions, see the recent dispute between China and the
United States. China to Impose Reciprocal Sanctions Against 6 US Individuals, 1 Entity; ‘1st Time Antiforeign Sanctions Law Used,’ GLOB. TIMES (July 24, 2021, 4:21 AM), https://www.globaltimes.cn/
page/202107/1229501.shtml [https://perma.cc/SD8A-C3T6].
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to set the tax sanction high enough to induce compliance by some, but not
necessarily all, targets.
We can summarize the reasons why Congress may want to deploy tax tools
as a “dimmer switch.” First, Congress could use tax sanctions when it wants
to discourage U.S. companies or individuals from undertaking some—but not
all—investment in certain states, such as those that are not ﬁrmly allied with
the United States but are not allied with U.S. adversaries either. Allowing
U.S. companies to participate in even a relatively disfavored foreign market
avoids opening a void into which the companies of adversary states may step.
Congress could also use tax sanctions when it wants to discourage U.S.
companies from investing in one group of states (autocracies, for example).
Second, it could discourage investment in some types of commercial activities
but not others (favoring investment in ecotourism and solar power, but not
military hardware or surveillance software, for instance) inside a single
country. Third, the United States could use tax sanctions to deter investment
in foreign assets without formally declaring contentious secondary economic
sanctions such as those found in the Helms-Burton Act.
C. The Case for Tax Sanctions Today
Our arguments about the benefits of tax sanctions so far are general, but
they have greater purchase now than in years past. If the benefits of using
the U.S. financial system decline because the alternatives are improving,
then the United States has less room to make demands on foreign targets,241
and the additional leverage available through tax sanctions becomes more
valuable. For example, the development of blockchain technology and
cryptocurrencies creates risks of an alternative to the existing payment
system.242 Although the U.S. dollar is still the preferred international reserve
currency, foreign currencies are becoming a larger share of global reserves.243
Frustration with the imposition of unilateral sanctions against Iran caused
European states to band together and form an alternative special purpose
vehicle to facilitate trade with Iran in a way that would not implicate the
U.S. financial system.244 And although the U.S. market is still attractive as
241 See generally Daniel W. Drezner, The United States of Sanctions: The Use and Abuse of Economic
Coercion, FOREIGN AFFS., Sept./Oct. 2021, at 142 (emphasizing the United States’ decline in
international power and the current ineﬃcacy of U.S. sanctions).
242 See HARRELL & ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 14 (describing technological advancements
such as cryptocurrency as a means for other countries to curtail sanctions, reducing the impact of
U.S. economic measures).
243 See id. at 24 (noting the decline in the share of global reserves denominated in U.S. dollars).
244 Jacob J. Lew, Preserving the Power of US Economic Statecraft (Apr. 30, 2019),
https://sipa.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/20190430-lew-economic-statecraft.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/E6WV-JJNS].
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a destination for foreign exporters, the emergence of growing middle classes
in China and India with disposable incomes may reduce the relative
importance of the U.S. export market.245
All of these are reasons to be concerned about overreliance on the existing
tools of economic coercion. The continued use of the U.S. dollar as a currency
for clearing international transactions is mostly the result of a coordination
equilibrium.246 It does not beneﬁt any one party or country to enter into
contracts cleared using a diﬀerent currency or outside of the U.S. ﬁnancial
system, but if foreigners could coordinate on a simultaneous shift to another
currency or clearing system, there may be very little cost to doing so. If such
a dislocation were to happen, the eﬀects on U.S. domestic interests would be
rapid and severe.
The primacy of the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency depends on
perceptions about the trustworthiness of U.S. institutions—speciﬁcally the
Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury—not to engage in activities that lead
to currency depreciation and volatility.247 It is striking that Treasury yields
fall during periods of global ﬁnancial insecurity, because U.S. government
debt is viewed as the safest asset. But the United States should not take this
position for granted. If divestment from the U.S. dollar were to happen—and
for certain countries it has begun—it could happen very quickly and with
great disruption.248 Moreover, recent budget and macroeconomic trends in
245 By one estimate, by 2027 there will be 1.2 billion Chinese consumers in the middle class,
accounting for twenty-ﬁve percent of the global total. Homi Kharas & Meagan Dooley, China’s
Influence on the Global Middle Class, in GLOBAL CHINA: THE IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA’S RISE AS
A GLOBAL ACTOR 309, 311 (Tarun Chhabra, Rush Doshi, Ryan Hass & Emilie Kimball eds., 2021).
246 See Enea Gjoza, Counting the Cost of Financial Warfare: Recalibrating Sanctions Policy to
Preserve U.S. Financial Hegemony, DEF. PRIORITIES (Nov. 2019), https://www.defensepriorities.org/
explainers/counting-the-cost-of-ﬁnancial-warfare [https://perma.cc/NQ69-KYMX] (arguing that
an overuse of US ﬁnancial sanctions could threaten US ﬁnancial dominance); see also Zoﬀer, supra
note 236, at 156 (noting that the emergence of the dollar as the world’s dominant currency was
“largely organic”).
247 This also depends on deep and liquid markets for trading U.S. dollars. See Daniel W.
Drezner, Why I Am Starting to Worry About the Dollar, WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2018/11/15/why-i-am-starting-worry-about-dollar
[https://perma.cc/87QZ-YP3C]. As of 2008, there was much debate over whether the market for the
Euro was becoming suﬃciently deep and liquid, raising questions about the primacy of the dollar.
See Galati & Wooldridge, supra note 233, at 3-4 (summarizing the debate).
248 See Daniel McDowell, Financial Sanctions and Political Risk in the International Currency
System, 28 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 635, 644 (2020) (noting that U.S. sanctions accelerated Russian
eﬀorts to “signiﬁcantly cut the dollar share of its foreign exchange reserves”); see also Darya
Korsunskaya & Alexander Marrow, Russian Rainy Day Fund to Get Out of All U.S. Dollar Assets,
REUTERS (June 3, 2021, 11:31 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-reserves/russianrainy-day-fund-to-get-out-of-all-u-s-dollar-assets-idUSKCN2DF1R9
[https://perma.cc/ZFU45G4X] (“Russia has been gradually reducing its dollar holdings since the imposition of Western
sanctions following Moscow’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, and has sought to partially decouple
from the Western ﬁnancial system.”).
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the United States may give foreigners additional reasons to rebalance their
foreign currency portfolios. Higher than average inﬂation in the wake of the
pandemic and large infrastructure and public spending legislation risks
endangering the long-term stability of the U.S. dollar.
By contrast, countries would forego real economic beneﬁts if they were to
stop trading and investing with U.S. consumers and businesses. Increasing
U.S. tax rates is unlikely to trigger a large, unexpected exodus of foreign ﬁrms
and individuals from the United States, and because tax incentives can be
modulated, it is easy to retrench if tax sanctions begin to drive foreigners out
of U.S. markets. Finally, and notwithstanding a recent surge in
protectionism, the project of global economic integration carries on. The
integration of goods and capital markets extends the reach of U.S. tax
jurisdiction still further. The beneﬁts of adding tax law to the toolbox are
greater now than ever, and the risks of not doing so are looming.
D. Other Advantages
Moving from an “on/oﬀ switch” to a “dimmer switch” approach to
sanctions not only provides greater ﬂexibility in setting incentives, but it also
changes the psychological frame for evaluating the sanction. Taxing income
from an activity, even at unfavorable rates, does not generally convey moral
disapproval or judgment, and it is not a punishment for engaging in that
conduct. Conveying moral opprobrium might be helpful in some cases, but
not in others. The use of tax rules can also avoid some of the harsh perceptions
that accompany sanctions (i.e., that the United States is trying to “strangle”
another country’s economy or industry). Of course, the United States could
communicate the reasons why certain taxpayers are being targeted, which may
be helpful in providing clarity about what those targets need to do to obtain
tax sanctions relief, but it may also be advantageous in certain circumstances
to let the tax incentives quietly do their work with little fanfare.
Another advantage of tax sanctions, given the ability to modulate by
degrees, is that it becomes possible to experiment with modest tax sanctions
and collect information on the results without triggering adverse
consequences. For example, foreign corporations with a U.S. nexus could be
compelled to report on activities in target states aﬀecting their business, such
as rights-suppressing laws, by a tax sanction. That sanction could increase
steadily over time until the point at which the foreign corporations begin to
comply or actually leave U.S. jurisdiction. By contrast, the costs of using the
ﬁnancial system and U.S. currency to target foreign actors—in terms of
increasing the risk of divestment—may be mostly invisible until the moment
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they are not. As discussed above, a coordinated move by foreign countries
away from the U.S. dollar or the U.S. ﬁnancial system as a clearinghouse for
cross-border transactions may come without much advance warning.
Finally, although we cannot be certain, we are also hopeful that putting
tax law in service of foreign policy will beneﬁt tax administration. The IRS
has suﬀered from declining support in recent years.249 The fact that the IRS
is the nation’s tax collector would seem to necessarily make it an unpopular
agency. But the IRS is tasked not only with revenue collection and law
enforcement, but also with making contested and ideologically fraught
judgments about things like tax-exempt status, which make it vulnerable to
being perceived as politicized. In 2013, concerns that the IRS was unduly
scrutinizing applications by conservative applicants for tax-exempt status
created an enormous uproar.250 Assertions about political bias at the IRS have
fueled posturing by elected oﬃcials and cuts to IRS funding, which
undermine the ability of the IRS to perform its primary function: tax law
enforcement.251 This is an important lesson. When the agency’s mission
creeps into politically fraught areas, it can undermine its ability to perform
its primary purpose. Delegating the enforcement of U.S. foreign policy to
the IRS could cut in either direction. Certain aspects of foreign policy—such
as anti-terrorism measures—may have broad and bipartisan popular support,
while others will be divisive.
IV. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES
In this ﬁnal Part, we anticipate objections to using tax law as a tool of
foreign policy and provide our replies. We start by describing tax norms and
why tax sanctions are not egregious transgressions of those norms. We then
turn to possible concerns about rent seeking, Congress’s competence to
legislate in this area, the adaptability of the Code to changing circumstances,
and issues with U.S. obligations under the WTO.

249 See Chuck Marr & Cecile Murray, IRS Funding Cuts Continue to Compromise Taxpayer Service
and Weaken Enforcement, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.cbpp.org/
sites/default/files/atoms/files/6-25-14tax.pdf [https://perma.cc/56EU-L7W7] (explaining that funding
cuts have required the IRS to reduce its workforce, cut training, and delay technological upgrades,
weakening tax enforcement capability); see also Drew Desilver, IRS Among Least-Popular Federal Agencies,
PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 16, 2013), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/05/16/irs-among-leastpopular-federal-agencies [https://perma.cc/G4UY-D7SJ] (finding that the public views the IRS as
eleventh out of fourteen federal agencies in terms of performance).
250 See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, “The Better Part of Valor Is Discretion”: Should the IRS Change or
Surrender Its Oversight of Tax Exempt Organizations?, 7 COLUM. J. TAX L. 80 (2016) (noting the
controversy and arguing that oversight of charitable and tax-exempt organizations should be moved
outside of the IRS into alternative regulatory bodies that could handle IRS matters).
251 Cf. Marr & Murray, supra note 249.
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A. Tax Norms
Tax policy is guided by concerns about equity, eﬃciency, and
administrability.252 The scholarly literature on these criteria is voluminous,
and its dizzying complexity need not concern us here. For our purposes, it is
only necessary to observe that these criteria generally point towards a policy
heuristic of neutrality, which is to say that all income should be taxed at the
same rate. To do otherwise could result in two taxpayers with the same
income paying diﬀerent amounts of tax (making it inequitable), redirecting
resources to the activity that generates favorably taxed income (making it
ineﬃcient), and requiring the tax authority to police the boundary between
the activity that generates favored income and other, similar activities that do
not (making it inadministrable).
There are also political reasons to favor neutrality as between diﬀerent
categories of income. Tax sanctions might appear to violate this neutrality
norm, and for this reason we anticipate objections to using tax law for foreign
policy. It is easy to contrive plausible but insincere policy reasons having to
do with culture, economic growth, or indeed national security, to favor certain
economic activities over others. Permitting favorable tax treatment for some
kinds of income invites rent seeking dressed up as principled tax policy. Once
the door is opened to using tax law to encourage desirable behaviors or make
social, industrial, or foreign policy, it becomes attractive for interest groups
to invest in rent-seeking behavior that is privately beneﬁcial but socially
wasteful. This behavior generally results in an undemocratic redistribution of
resources and ineﬃcient market interventions. We discuss these political
economy considerations in greater detail in Section IV.B.
In practice, Congress honors the neutrality principle as much in the
breach as in the observance.253 And yet the heuristic is a powerful one that
drives periodic calls for “tax reform,” an evergreen source of political energy
that entails broadening the tax base to become more neutral among diﬀerent
categories of income, thus reducing tax rates.
Neutrality heuristics have also been the dominant frame for thinking
about international taxation, with capital export neutrality (CEN) being
particularly inﬂuential in guiding U.S. international tax policy.254 CEN aims
252 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX L. REV. 1, 1 (2006) (noting
that the traditional grounds for evaluating tax policy are eﬃciency, equity, and administrability).
253 See Susannah Camic Tahk, Everything Is Tax: Evaluating the Structural Transformation of
U.S. Policymaking, 50 HARV. J. LEGIS. 67, 69-73 (2013) (noting that “[t]hroughout the last quarter
century, the federal government has been increasing its use of the tax code to accomplish key
objectives,” including the use of tax credits to accomplish anti-poverty, sustainable energy, and
health care reform goals).
254 Michael S. Knoll, Reconsidering International Tax Neutrality, 64 TAX L. REV. 99, 99 (2011).
Professor Knoll argues that the term CEN in fact means diﬀerent things to economists—for whom
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to ensure that taxes are neutral with respect to the source of a taxpayer’s
income, so that U.S. taxpayers make investment decisions on the basis of pretax rates of return, regardless of whether those investments are in the United
States or abroad.255
The primary mechanism for implementing CEN is the foreign tax credit,
which reduces U.S. taxes on foreign-source income by the amount of foreign
income taxes paid on that income.256 In theory, this means that U.S. persons
pay the same tax rate on income, regardless of where it is earned. This form
of neutrality advances global economic eﬃciency. But eﬃciency immediately
loses some of its obvious appeal in the international context. Why should the
United States adopt international tax rules that improve global eﬃciency
rather than the welfare of U.S. citizens or residents?257 It is natural to believe,
as Professor Graetz has argued, that U.S. tax policy should “give adequate
priority to the goals and interests of the American people.”258
In the domestic context, neutrality norms serve equity, efficiency, and
administrability goals. They also serve as a (leaky) bulwark against rent
seeking by interest groups. Because departures from neutrality typically
create competitive winners and losers in the marketplace, there are political
checks against rent seeking. But the politics of international taxation are
different. In the international tax context, the losers from non-neutralities
may be foreigners who do not vote in U.S. elections and who are at a
disadvantage when it comes to lobbying lawmakers. This suggests that the
political headwinds against pursuing foreign policy through the
international tax rules likely are weaker than those against implementing
social policy through purely domestic tax rules. Moreover, persistent
disagreement about the normative foundations of international tax policy,259
and the uneasy justification for international neutrality norms to begin with,
make it easier for other policy considerations—such as national security—to
intervene. As Professor Graetz has argued, “Only the view that the tax law
is always a bad way to do things other than raise revenue—the perspective

a better term is competitive neutrality—than to lawyers—for whom it means locational neutrality.
Id. at 100.
255 Diane Ring, International Tax Relations: Theory and Implications, 60 TAX L. REV. 83, 87
(2007) (“The basic goals other than revenue of the international tax system are the same ones
generally espoused for domestic tax policy: eﬃciency, equity, and administrability.”).
256 I.R.C. § 901.
257 Sometimes pursuing global welfare may be helpful in achieving greater national welfare.
Daniel Shaviro, Why Worldwide Welfare as a Normative Standard in U.S. Tax Policy?, 60 TAX L. REV.
155, 157 (2007).
258 Graetz, supra note 153, at 307.
259 Mason, supra note 180, at 354, 389-93 (describing conﬂicting views on economic eﬃciency
and distributional fairness dating back to the early twentieth century).
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of tax-expenditure religionists—would rule out the tax law as an implement
of U.S. foreign policy.”260
B. Political Economy Concerns
Using tax incentives for non-tax policy goals attracts rent seeking. This is
a downside to using carrots to steer resources to support foreign policy
objectives. Moreover, it is diﬃcult to terminate these beneﬁts once they have
become entrenched, because the beneﬁts are concentrated but, as with all tax
expenditures, the costs are widely dispersed among current taxpayers or
future generations that will have to pay for the deﬁcit-ﬁnanced tax
expenditure. And extraordinary tax interventions made during the 2008–
2009 ﬁnancial crisis illustrate the diﬃculty in obtaining standing to oppose
favorable tax treatment for competitors.261
The tariﬀs and import restrictions imposed by the Trump Administration
illustrate how foreign policy can be a ﬁg leaf for industrial policy.262 As
Professor Noah Feldman put it, “[T]he national security rationale has the
capacity to kill free trade, a little bit at a time.”263 Departing from established
neutrality norms to use tax law for foreign policy purposes, as we endorse
here, creates similar risks, although we think that the risks are smaller than
with tariﬀs and import restrictions. For example, inbound tax sanctions such
as increased rates of withholding on investment income will, in theory, shelter
U.S. investors from the competition of certain foreign investors. We do not
think, however, that domestic politics are likely to make this form of
protectionism appealing.264 Squeezing out foreign investors through higher
rates of tax will only drive up the costs to U.S. businesses of raising capital,
which will tend to reduce worker wages and employment. Contemporary

Graetz, supra note 153, at 309.
For a discussion of some of these measures, see generally Albert H. Choi, Quinn Curtis &
Andrew T. Hayashi, Crisis-Driven Tax Law: The Case of Section 382, 23 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 9-27 (2019)
(summarizing regulatory and tax responses to the 2008 crisis, including TARP, § 382, and IRS
Notice 2008-83); for a discussion of taxpayer standing, see generally Paul B. Stephan III, Nontaxpayer
Litigation of Income Tax Disputes, 3 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 73 (1984) (discussing purported private
enforcement of tax statutes).
262 It can be diﬃcult to draw a distinction between protectionism and general national security
interests. Noah Feldman, Huawei and 5G: A Case Study in the Future of Free Trade, BLOOMBERG
(Feb. 13, 2019, 2:38 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-02-13/huawei-and-5g-acase-study-in-the-future-of-free-trade [https://perma.cc/K4CC-X69M].
263 Id.
264 These protectionist eﬀects will also raise issues under the U.S. international legal
obligations discussed infra Section IV.E.
260
261
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protectionism is driven by concerns about jobs,265 so it seems unlikely that
political pressures will line up behind the interests of domestic capital.
Outbound tax sanctions and increased reporting obligations impose costs,
not beneﬁts, on U.S. businesses. We would expect that U.S. businesses will
generally lobby to avoid having to bear these costs. And the politics of
imposing costs on a relatively narrow constituency with widely dispersed
beneﬁts in the form of improved national security suggests that there will
likely be political headwinds against using tax law in this way. Thus, the risk
when it comes to using tax law to increase information reporting and
outbound tax sanctions is not that they will be ineﬃciently popular, but
instead that they will not be able to overcome industry opposition.
It is possible that certain market participants will actually be in favor of
these additional compliance costs. If there are economies of scale from
compliance with a tax sanctions regime, then larger firms may embrace these
new obligations to the extent they help deter new, smaller entrants to the
marketplace. We cannot say for certain just how significant the political
economy problems associated with rent seeking are likely to be. Unless the
process of adopting and removing tax sanctions is insulated from political
actors—and we do not think it can, or should, be—then there will be aggressive
lobbying. Exactly how problematic that is will depend on institutional design
details about how tax sanctions are administered, and we cannot consider all
of the possibilities here. There are bound to be rent-seeking issues regardless
of whether important decisions about tax sanctions are made by Congress or
the Executive Branch. At the same time, we do not think that introducing tax
sanctions will necessarily worsen rent-seeking behavior that already takes place
under the guise of improving the competitiveness of U.S. companies,
protecting American workers, and so forth.266
Instead, we think that the bigger concern from a political economy
perspective is how politicians—rather than private industry—may respond to
using tax sanctions for foreign policy. The reason is that these sanctions will
tend to raise revenue, and they may be seen as politically expedient oﬀsets to
increased government spending or tax cuts. One way of dissuading Congress
from succumbing to the temptation to impose excessive tax sanctions for the
purpose of raising revenue would be to delegate to the Executive the ability
to designate the tax sanctions targets.
Of course, the Executive is not entirely insulated from pressure, but it is
further removed from lobbying by a large bureaucracy that is designed to
265 Adam Mordecai, Anti-Oﬀshoring Legislation: The New Wave of Protectionism: The Backlash
Against Foreign Outsourcing of American Service Jobs, 5 RICH. J. GLOB. L. & BUS. 85, 91 (2005).
266 The CFIUS regime, discussed supra Section I.C, is an example of an institution that has
expanded beyond its initial conception as the deﬁnition of national security has grown.
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make policy based on expert views and to be less directly exposed to lobbying.
Why would Congress agree to delegate the power to identify targets? Because
it recognizes that the Executive has greater access to relevant intelligence and
a more ﬁnely tuned understanding of foreign relations. And, whatever its
reasons, Congress has already made these kinds of delegations in a range of
other areas, including both export controls and ﬁnancial sanctions.
C. Institutional Competence
One argument against an increased reliance on tax sanctions is that the
actors in Congress who would draft them are unfamiliar with foreign
policy.267 However, various congressional committees already play
significant roles in crafting financial statutes that implicate foreign policy.268
Adding foreign policy–related tax tools to the agenda would not impose an
unduly heavy burden on the congressional committees who would help craft
those tools.
In general, the Executive plays the leading role among the three branches
in establishing and executing foreign policy.269 Some see Congress as
parochial, with a much stronger institutional focus on, and expertise about,
domestic issues than foreign ones.270 Further, as the Executive often asserts,271
the conduct of U.S. foreign policy requires the government to react ﬂexibly
to changing circumstances overseas; statutes often ﬁx policy at a particular
point in time and thus diminish that ﬂexibility.
That said, Congress has played a robust role in establishing sanctions
regimes. As discussed in Part I, Congress has enacted statutes that empower
the President to impose sanctions on human rights violators, nuclear
proliferators, and the leadership of particular states. These statutes usually
267 We do not foresee any constitutional barriers to tax sanctions in general. Congress can
likely impose tax sanctions under its taxing power or its foreign commerce power. We note that
outbound tax sanctions are already employed under § 901. See supra notes 198–199 and accompanying
text. Although Congress has not given the Executive the ability to set tax rates, some scholars argue
that it could delegate more tax power than it does. See, e.g., James R. Hines Jr. & Kyle D. Logue,
Delegating Tax, 114 MICH. L. REV. 235 (2015).
268 For a discussion of foreign aﬀairs in committees, see ANDRES B. SCHWARZENBERG ET
AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV. R45474, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE: OVERVIEW AND
ISSUES FOR THE 116TH CONGRESS (2020) (providing a broad overview of select topics in
international trade and ﬁnance, focusing on prominent issues that have been the subject of recent
discussion and debate that may come before the 116th Congress).
269 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-24 (1936) (noting that the
President represents the government of the United States in its foreign aﬀairs).
270 E.g., Bryan W. Marshall & Patrick J. Haney, The Impact of Party Conflict on Executive
Ascendancy and Congressional Abdication in US Foreign Policy, INT’L POL. (July 13, 2021),
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-021-00326-z [https://perma.cc/UE4Z-R9X4].
271 James M. Lindsay, Congress and Foreign Policy: Why the Hill Matters, 107 POL. SCI. Q.
607, 611 (1992).
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accommodate the need for foreign policy expertise and ﬂexibility by creating
a framework within which the Executive can impose sanctions, while allowing
the Executive to make (or not make) certain ﬁndings that actually implement
the sanctions or waive their imposition.272
A range of congressional committees drafted these sanctions statutes. The
Helms-Burton Act was drafted by the House International Relations, Ways
and Means, Judiciary, and Banking and Financial Services Committees.273
The Senate Finance and Foreign Relations Committees, together with the
House Foreign Aﬀairs and Judiciary Committees, drafted the Global
Magnitsky Act,274 which allows the federal government to sanction
individuals accused of human rights violations. And CAATSA, which
sanctioned Iran, North Korea, and Russia, was produced by the House
Foreign Aﬀairs, Intelligence, Judiciary, Oversight and Government Reform,
Armed Services, Financial Services, Rules, Ways and Means, and
Transportation and Infrastructure Committees.275 This indicates that a range
of committees—beyond simply the House and Senate foreign relations
committees—have periodic exposure to and opportunity to legislate on
foreign aﬀairs issues.
Beyond sanctions, the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance
Committees produced the trade statutes under which the Executive has
deployed tariﬀs for foreign policy purposes. Those committees produced the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962276 and the Trade Act of 1974.277 The Senate
Banking, Housing, and Urban Aﬀairs Committee and the International Trade
272 A good example of this is the regime under § 901(j) of the Code, described above in
subsection II.C.2.
273 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114,
110 Stat. 785 (codiﬁed in scattered titles and sections of U.S.C.). For a full list of committee actions,
see H.R.927 - Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, CONGRESS.GOV
https://www.congress.gov/bill/104th-congress/house-bill/927/actions [https://perma.cc/YHR5-Q9RK].
274 Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Global Magnitsky Act), Pub. L. No.
114-328; 130 Stat. 2000 (codiﬁed at 22 U.S.C. 2656). For a full list of committee actions, see S.284 Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, GONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/
114th-congress/senate-bill/284/all-actions?s=10&r=1 [https://perma.cc/KS5L-ZEWH].
275 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, Pub. L. No. 115-44, 131 Stat. 886
(2017) (codiﬁed in scattered titles and sections of U.S.C.). For a full list of committee actions, see
H.R.3364 – Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://
www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/3364/actions [https://perma.cc/7VJ7-SFFK].
276 See Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872, 877 (codiﬁed in scattered
titles and sections of U.S.C.) (“[The President] shall take such action, and for such time, as he deems
necessary to adjust the imports of such article and its derivatives so that such imports will not so
threaten to impair the national security.”).
277 See H.R.10710 - An Act to Promote the Development of an Open, Nondiscriminatory, and Fair
World Economic System, to Stimulate Fair and Free Competition Between the United States and Foreign
Nations, to Foster and Economic Growth of, and Full Employment in, the United States, and for Other
Purposes, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/93rd-congress/house-bill/10710/actions
[https://perma.cc/LP6J-BGNE].
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and Finance Subcommittee drafted the 1999 reauthorization of the Export
Administration Act.278
Today, the House Ways and Means Committee drafts tax legislation279
consistent with the constitutional requirement that all legislation
concerning taxation must originate in the House.280 Of course, as with many
statutes, the Executive Branch may help draft the bills’ language.281
According to the Treasury Department, “[m]ost recommendations for new
tax legislation come from the President,” with the Treasury Department and
IRS playing the primary role in preparing those recommendations.282
Because members on the House Ways and Means Committee and the
Senate’s equivalent (the Finance Committee) are very senior, they are likely
to be seasoned legislators who have been periodically exposed to foreign
relations issues.283 In the House, the Speaker may refer a measure to more
than one committee (either initially or seriatim) such that the Speaker can
ensure that both the Ways and Means and the House International
Relations Committee review a bill.284 Likewise, Senate Rule XVII allows
the Senate majority and minority leaders jointly to refer a measure to
several committees for consideration simultaneously or seriatim.285
In short, while it is likely that members of the congressional committees
that would be responsible for initiating foreign policy–related tax bills will be
less steeped in foreign relations issues than members of Congress’s foreign
relations committees, they may have more experience than one might assume
at ﬁrst glance. At the very least, they are capable of interfacing with their
foreign relations committee colleagues and the Executive Branch to ensure
that the bills will advance U.S. foreign policy. This interfacing should happen
more when revising international tax provisions, in any event. Not doing this
can lead to unintentional conﬂicts between U.S. domestic tax law and
278 S.1712 - Export Administration Act of 1999, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/
106th-congress/senate-bill/1712/all-actions [https://perma.cc/9MVA-R2TG].
279 Jurisdiction & Rules, WAYS & MEANS COMM., https://waysandmeans.house.gov/about/
jurisdiction-and-rules [https://perma.cc/DN26-7XRX].
280 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
281 See Ashley Deeks, Statutory International Law, 57 VA. J. INT’L L. 263 (2018) (discussing the
role of the Executive Branch in suggesting language for statutes).
282 Writing and Enacting Tax Legislation, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/taxes/pages/writing.aspx [https://perma.cc/H556-C3PG].
283 See Emma Roller, Stephanie Stamm & National Journal, Here Are America's Most Wanted
(House Committee Chairmen), ATLANTIC (June 5, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2014/06/here-are-americas-most-wanted-house-committee-chairmen/455682 [https://
perma.cc/44R6-4PQM] (showing the popularity and power of the Ways and Means Committee).
284 MARK J. OLESZEK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46251, COMMITTEE JURISDICTION AND
REFERRAL IN THE HOUSE (2020) (describing the practice of multiple referral in the House).
285 Rules of the Senate, RULES & ADMIN., https://www.rules.senate.gov/rules-of-the-senate
[https://perma.cc/X9KL-UUSM].

2022]

Tax Law as Foreign Policy

337

international treaty obligations286 or undermine foreign policy provisions in
existing tax law, as we discussed in Part II in connection with TCJA.
D. Dynamism
An important design question is the ease with which countries or entities
can be added to, or removed from, a list of actors subject to tax sanctions. A
common criticism of traditional sanctions is that they are rarely rolled back,
and that countries or individuals on sanctions lists stay there longer than they
should.287 This raises questions of both fairness and eﬀectiveness, as sanctions
can only induce a change in behavior if the target believes that the change in
behavior will prompt the United States to remove the sanction.288
One possibility is for Congress to make tax sanctions mandatory.
Congress could, for example, pass a bill that disallowed foreign tax credits for
income taxes paid to the government of a speciﬁed country, perhaps adding
it by name to the list of countries currently covered by § 901(j). Doing so
would require that it be embedded in a bill passed by the House and Senate
and signed by the President. In addition to giving greater inﬂuence to
Congress in the arena of foreign policy, the legislative process means that it
would take longer to add new names to the list. If states and individuals are
added to the list by name, then it will also take a legislative act by Congress
to remove them from the list. This builds in longer delays at the back end as
well. In cases where speed is important, these delays are a shortcoming of
making tax sanctions mandatory and such tax sanctions will almost certainly
be “stickier” and more likely to outlast their usefulness.289 Moreover, if
revisions to the tax sanctions list were included in legislation, then those
revisions could be derailed by unrelated parts of a bill.
An alternative—and we think better—approach is the one that is currently
used in § 901(j). The determination of whether § 901(j) applies to a country
is made by the Executive and can be implemented by Executive Order in
comparatively short order.290 Further, allowing the Executive to add countries
or other entities to the tax sanctions list would provide the Executive with
286 See, e.g., Richard L. Doernberg, Legislative Override of Incomes Tax Treaties: The Branch Profits
Tax and Congressional Arrogation of Authority, 42 TAX LAW. 173, 201 (1989) (noting that the branch
proﬁts tax intentionally overrode treaty obligations).
287 See Haass, supra note 2 (“It is often difficult or impossible to build a consensus for
rescinding a sanction, even if there has been some progress on the matter of concern, if the
sanction has been shown to be feckless or counterproductive, or if other interests can be shown
to suffer as a result.”).
288 See id. (“Sanctions tend to be easier to introduce than to lift. It is almost always more
diﬃcult to change the status quo than to continue with it.”) (emphasis removed).
289 See, for example, the Jackson-Vanik sanctions described supra note 77.
290 See I.R.C. § 901(j)(2)(A) (listing countries to which § 901(j) applies).
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greater ﬂexibility and responsiveness based on changing conditions in foreign
countries and changing behaviors by sanctioned entities, something
important in the foreign policy arena.
E. Unilateralism and International Law
We have not taken a position in this article about whether tax sanctions
should be imposed in coordination with allies or whether they should be used
on a unilateral basis. Nevertheless, we have mostly argued for increased use
of tax sanctions under the assumption that they will be imposed unilaterally.
For the most part, tax sanctions do not raise novel questions about the
costs and beneﬁts of coordinating with other countries to impose sanctions
on a multilateral—rather than a unilateral—basis. Traditional sanctions work
best when they are imposed with broad international support.291 Although
early research seemed to indicate that unilateral sanctions could be more
eﬀective than multilateral sanctions, recent scholarship suggests otherwise.292
As a theoretical matter, coordinating with allies in the imposition of tax
sanctions is likely to increase the costs of the sanctions to the foreign target.
To illustrate, the imposition of withholding taxes on investment income
payable by all members of the OECD to the foreign target would have a much
greater impact on the performance of the target’s investment portfolio than
the unilateral imposition of taxes. Multilateral tax sanctions thereby make it
easier to reduce the wealth of the target because it is more diﬃcult to
substitute for alternative investments.
Multilateralism also reduces the costs to the United States of imposing
tax sanctions. To again use the example of increased withholding taxes, if all
investment income were subject to the increased tax rate for the foreign target
regardless of source, then divestment from the United States would never be
attractive and the target would have to choose between paying the tax
sanction or changing its behavior. And there are reputational costs to the
United States from imposing unilateral sanctions. For example, the U.N.
General Assembly has passed 29 near-unanimous resolutions condemning
U.S. sanctions on Cuba.293 On the other hand, obtaining agreement among
multiple governments about the substance of tax sanctions will inevitably
require that the United States compromise to reach such an agreement.

Lew, supra note 244.
Bapat & Morgan, supra note 232, at 1092.
Edith M. Lederer, US Votes Against UN Resolution Condemning US Embargo on Cuba,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 23, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/united-nations-united-nationsgeneral-assembly-middle-east-cuba-business-3d55820f2daeb666e1c91eaddae5fd2c [https://perma.cc/
W8ZL-7SW9].
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The most significant legal obstacles to greater use of U.S. income tax law
as a stick in foreign policymaking are the U.S. obligations under
international law, specifically the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) that
underpin the WTO.294 The central problem is that negative tax treatment
that turns on a foreign/domestic distinction—for example, an inbound tax
sanction that increases withholding tax rates on dividends paid to persons
who do business with a foreign target—is presumptively noncompliant with
WTO obligations.
To impose tax sanctions and remain WTO-compliant, the United States
will likely need to invoke the national security exception under Article XXI
of the GATT and GATS. As Professor Voon has noted, “Signiﬁcant
uncertainty surrounds this provision.”295 The United States has taken the
position that the national security exception is nonjusticiable by the WTO.296
This position has other supporters, including the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
and perhaps Russia, but the European Union takes the position that the state
invoking the exception bears the burden of proving its applicability.
If the United States maintains its current view, then the political question
about whether to impose tax sanctions and invoke the national security
exception in any trade dispute arising through the WTO requires balancing
the beneﬁts of the tax sanction against the possible eﬀects of undermining
the WTO and global free trade order, which generally serves U.S. interests.297
Some scholars are deeply concerned about the unravelling eﬀects that overuse
of the national security exception could have on the WTO, while others
believe that free trade can be sustained through a self-enforcing process
among states and that the national security exception can be kept from
swallowing up the general agreement through the selective, good-faith use of
the exception.298 Aggressive use of tax sanctions through invocation of the
national security exception would put these two views to the test.

294 Tania Voon, Can International Trade Law Recover? The Security Exception in WTO Law:
Entering a New Era, 113 AJIL UNBOUND 45, 45 (2019) (“[T]he security exception lies at the center
of multiple explosive disputes, posing a potential threat to the WTO’s very existence.”).
295 Id.
296 See id. at 47 (“The suggestion that the security exception is wholly self-judging takes
on an even more extreme form in the view of the United States, which sees the exception as
‘non-justiciable.’”).
297 For a discussion of these issues, see Paul B. Stephan, Sovereignty and the World Economy, 17
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 649, 665-66 (2021).
298 Compare BRANDON J. MURRILL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10223, THE “NATIONAL
SECURITY EXCEPTION” AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 4 (2018) (“Arguably,
allowing a WTO Member to take any measure it deems essential to its security interests would
defeat [the objective of security and predictability in the multilateral trading system] . . . .”), with
Roger P. Alford, The Self-Judging WTO Security Exception, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 697, 758 (noting
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CONCLUSION
The use of economic sanctions is at a high-water mark in the United
States, but there is reason to be concerned about overreach and signs of
rebellion by foreign allies and adversaries against the overuse of these
sanctions. There are limits to how much the United States can exploit the
primacy of the dollar and the centrality of the U.S. ﬁnancial system to coerce
foreign actors before they seek alternatives that do not leave them exposed to
U.S. foreign policy imperatives. We need to ﬁnd alternative points of
economic leverage to ensure that our existing levers do not break under the
strain. Tax law is a partial answer.

that generally Member States consider the security exception to be self-judging and assume it is
invoked in good faith).

